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Abstract
Mustafa Haluk Guler: Housing Wealth Effects Mechanism and the Monetary Policy
Transmission in Turkey
(Under the direction of Richard T. Froyen)
It is commonly presumed that significant movements in wealth can often have wider eco-
nomic impacts in consumer spending. This study first investigates the impact of hous-
ing wealth on aggregate consumer spending in the context of Turkey using a Vector Er-
ror Correction Method (VECM) under the structural break with quarterly data for the
1991Q1-2011Q1 period. Furthermore, to improve the robustness to instability in the
long-run relationship between the variables, we also estimate an alternative econometric
model based upon Carroll (2004). Both the VECM and Carroll’s method suggest that
permanent changes in housing wealth have considerable effects on aggregate consump-
tion after 2001 while there is no significant financial wealth effect for the same period.
Since our VECM results indicate that housing wealth does play a role in determining
consumption, the next step is to find out whether there is a linkage between monetary
policy and housing wealth and if so, how this relationship operates. For this purpose,
we employ a kind of counterfactual experiment. Our results show that interest rate af-
fects the housing market considerably and house prices play an important role in the
monetary transmission.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Household consumption is a function of not only income but also wealth, such as hous-
ing and stock ownership. When the prices of houses or financial assets increase, the own-
ers’ wealth increases and this can spur aggregate consumption, even as income remains
the same. Such change in consumption due to a change in housing or stock prices is called
‘wealth effect’.
With respect to the wealth effect of housing, the last decade has witnessed dramatic
rise in house prices, followed by substantial price collapse. From 1995-2006, housing
wealth soared globally, with an acceleration after 2000 supported by the combination
of lower interest rates and abundant liquidity. Between the mid 1990s and 2006, the
growth rate of real house price rises in many mature economies reached double-digit
figures (Table A.1).
As the favorable conditions for housing ended with the tightening of monetary policy
in response to global inflationary pressures, housing markets, especially the subprime
mortgage market in the US, came under severe stress. Combined with deficiencies in
the mortgage industry, house prices started to fall dramatically. As measured by the
Standard & Poor’s Case-Shiller index, average home prices in the U.S. were down 32.2
percent as ofMarch 2009 after a peak in the second quarter of 2006. As the subprime crisis
intensified in the US, it damaged the broader economy and eventually triggered a world-
wide economic downturn. Consumer spending in OECD countries was cut back and the
global output contracted worst since the Great Depression (G-20 Progress Report, 2009).
Since consumption is inherently connected with households’ saving decisions which
could affect price levels and output, in the light of the recent global developments in
housing, it is vital for monetary authority to understand the relationship between hous-
ing wealth and consumption as well as the channels through which such a link might
operate.
Overview of Selected International Studies
There have been numerous academic and government researches that examine hous-
ing wealth effects, particularly for advanced economies. Most, but not all, studies indicate
consensus that rising house prices stimulate consumers to spend more than they would
without such price increases (Case et al. (2005), Ludwig and Slok (2004), Girouard and
Blondal (2001), Carroll et al. (2004)). However, the empirical literature is inconclusive
about the estimates of the marginal propensity to consume out of housing wealth. These
estimates vary substantially across studies. The dispersion in the findings with respect
to the magnitude and timing of the wealth effects stems from the use of different types
of consumption and wealth data and/or different estimation techniques that are used to
test the wealth effects. The differences may also stem from the unstable nature of wealth
effects over time.
In recent literature, Case et al. (2005) did a pioneering work in assessing the wealth
effects. The study covered measures of housing wealth for both a panel of 14 developed
economies for the period of 1975-1999 and a panel of all US states from 1982 through
1999. The results of the study suggest that housing wealth effect on consumption is sta-
tistically significant and it is rather large compared to financial wealth for both panels of
data. For the US, the estimate of the elasticity of consumption to housing wealth is found
around 0.04-0.06 while for the international panel, it is about 0.11-0.14. The authors re-
port that the estimated effects for the US are substantially stronger after the mid 1980s
due to the tax reform that favored the use of home equity loans for consumption.
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Another multi-country study is conducted by Ludwig and Slok (2004) for the IMF
examining a panel of quarterly data from 1960 through 2000 for 16 OECD economies
divided into bank-based (e.g. Germany, Italy) and market-based (e.g. US, UK) credit
market systems. The authors estimated a larger effect of financial wealth than that from
housing wealth with anMPC of about 8 percent which is twice as large as the elasticity of
house prices. However, due to the use of a single equation approach and data deficiencies
for some countries in the data set, the results are cautioned to be at best, tentative.
Among the studies that have found a role for housing wealth, Girouard and Blondal
(2001) also suggest positive effect of housing wealth for the period 1970-1999 for the US,
the UK, Japan, France as well as Canada with MPCs ranging from 0.02 for the US to 0.18
for Canada, whereas the authors found negative effect of housing wealth for Italy.
Considering the potential instabilities in an economic environment, Carroll et al.
(2004) introduces a new methodology based on the sluggishness of aggregate consump-
tion growth to measure wealth effects for shorter period of time. This method distin-
guishes between immediate (next-quarter) and eventual wealth effects. According to Car-
roll et al.(2004)’s estimation of stock and non-stock wealth effects on consumption for the
US through 1960-2003, while ‘immediate’ wealth effects on consumption are very small
with an MPC out of housing wealth around 2 cents, ‘eventual’ effects are much larger
after several quarters with an MPC amounting to 9 cents.
The Case of Turkey
Although there is a wide range of empirical work, the vast majority of empirical
evidence, refers to advanced economies, particularly the US. However, considering the
increasingly deregulated and deepened financial systems, the accelerated aggregate con-
sumption as well as rising property values in emerging economies, extending the existing
literature to assess the inter-relationship between housing and consumption is critically
important.
Turkey is a case in point in this matter. Studying the link between consumption and
3
housing wealth in Turkey is first motivated by the very high rates of homeownership
and the predominance of housing in total household wealth. The earlier experiences of
very high inflation and shallow financial markets have made the housing asset one of the
most preferred forms of wealth accumulation in Turkey. In addition to that, real price
of housing and the housing stock have followed an increasing trend. Between 2001 and
2011, housing wealth increased approximately 10% annually in real terms. Furthermore,
as the country’s macroeconomic environment has become more stable after 2001, there
has been an expansion of financial products including long-term housing credits. More
importantly, there is a growing interest in mortgage lending which led to the passage of
the new Mortgage Law by the Parliament as of 2007. This legislation is expected to in-
crease the share of housing wealth in wealth composition via raising either the housing
stock (home ownership ratio) or housing prices, ceteris paribus. Due to the recent devel-
opments, future housing wealth effects in Turkey are likely to become more pronounced.
However, to our knowledge, there are only a few contributions which study the Turk-
ish case in depth. Employing weak empirical methodologies and bad proxies for housing
asset value which is due to the lack of data on house stocks and house prices, existing
studies on the housing wealth effect has generally produced poor results. Even more im-
portantly, none of the studies take the structural change in Turkish economy during the
2001 crisis into account.
Chapter II of this dissertation aims to improve the deficiencies of the methodologies
employed in earlier studies by using a system approach that takes the structural break
into consideration, namely the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM), and introduces
a new proxy for housing wealth. Examining the effect of housing wealth as well as finan-
cial wealth upon aggregate consumption in Turkey for the period 1991Q1-2011Q1, our
study indicates that disposable income is the major factor that determines consumption
in Turkey in the long run. However the effect of disposable income decreases after the
2001 crisis whereas the long-run consumption effects of housing wealth get stronger in
the post-crisis period. It is also found that financial wealth is positive before the 2001
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crisis while it gets insignificant after the crisis. Furthermore, as an alternative to the coin-
tegration approach, we employ Carroll (2004)’s methodology for the post-crisis period
(after 2001) for estimating the short term and medium term wealth effects on consump-
tion, which does not require stability in cointegrating vectors. The results based on Car-
roll (2004)’s method conclude that both in the short term and medium term, income
and housing wealth have sizeable impacts on consumption whereas no significant effect
is found for financial wealth. The findings of the cointegration approach and Carroll’s
methodology are found to be parallel.
Since consumption is affected by housing wealth, as shown for the Turkish case in
Chapter II, and house prices are influenced by interest rates, there is a channel of mone-
tary policy transmission through house prices and it is important to search how this link
operates. In this regard, Chapter III examines such linkage between monetary policy
and housing wealth and to investigate the role of house prices in monetary transmission
mechanism in Turkey for the period 1991Q1-2011Q1. For this purpose, we employ a
kind of counterfactual experiment. The results show that house prices do play a consid-
erable role in consumption and residential investment in only the medium term (2 year
period) before 2001 whereas they play a crucial role in only the long term (five year pe-
riod) after 2001. Our study suggests that before 2001, following a contractionary interest
rate shock, the increase in house prices is responsible for almost all decreases seen in con-
sumption and residential investment in the medium term. During this period, a house
price change has no long-term effects on consumption and residential investment. After
2001, in response to a contractionary interest rate shock, a decrease in house price has
long-term effects accounting for 33 percent of the fall in consumption and 75 percent of
the fall in residential construction.
The final chapter of this dissertation explores the implications of the findings of pre-
vious chapters for the conduct of monetary policy and presents the conclusions.
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Chapter 2
Wealth Effects on Consumption: An Empirical Study on Turkey
It is commonly presumed that significant movements in wealth can often have wide
economic impacts in consumer spending. This chapter examines the effect of hous-
ing wealth and financial wealth upon aggregate consumption in Turkey for the period
1991Q1-2011Q1 by using a system approach, namely the Vector Error Correction Model
(VECM). The study includes the structral break in the model and improves on the
methodologies presented in previous studies which mostly employed Engle-Granger sin-
gle equation estimation. Having reviewed the earlier methods’ deficiencies to measure
housing wealth, this study also introduces a new measure as a proxy for housing wealth.
The results of the paper indicate that disposable income is the major factor determining
consumption in the long run for Turkey. Also, in the long run, consumption effects of
housing wealth and financial wealth are both found to be positive before 2001. After
the 2001 crisis, housing wealth effect gets larger whereas financial wealth effect becomes
insignificant.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 reviews the possible wealth-
consumption transmission channels and the arguments on the differences between hous-
ing and financial wealth with respect to their consumption effects. Section 2 briefly re-
views the theoretical framework. Section 3 discusses the estimation methodology while
Section 4 summarizes the empirical literature on Turkey. Section 5 and 6 provide the
empirical analysis. Lastly, Section 7 presents the conclusions.
2.1 Wealth Effects: Housing Wealth and Financial Wealth
In modern literature, deriving from the permanent income hypothesis developed by
Friedman (1957) and the lifecycle model, developed by Modigliani and Ando (1960) and
Ando and Modigliani (1963), consumption theory suggests that the level of household
consumption is a function of permanent income, demographic variables and physical
wealth that includes both housing and financial wealth. As suggested by the standard life-
cycle model, in response to an unexpected increase in the value of a household’s assets
such as stocks or housing value, a household will increase its spending.
This basic idea and theoretical link between wealth and consumption have been ex-
tended in a number of directions to obtain a more realistic view of consumption behav-
ior. In particular, the so-called collateral effect, which implies an increase in borrowing
capacity, is considered to be an important channel through which accumulated wealth
can stimulate consumer spending. Given the asymmetric information about borrowers
that requires them to provide collateral in credit markets, when there is a rise in wealth,
it will increase the value of the collateral. This will potentially leads to more borrowing
to finance extra consumption using the appreciated asset as collateral. In other words, the
increase in financial wealth or housing wealth can lead to higher consumption by increas-
ing the borrowing capacity of previously credit-constrained households. This collateral
channel underpins much of the empirical work on the consumption and housing wealth
link for developed countries like the US and the UK where there is easy access to mort-
gage lending and home equity loans. However, this effect is also becoming significant in
emerging countries like Turkey as the mortgage market and relevant financial products
are developing rapidly, which may be interpreted from Figure B.1. According to Figure
B.1, the share of consumer credit with housing collateral in total consumer credits has
risen dramatically in recent years. This may show that the collateral effect of housing
wealth has begun to play an increasing role on consumption behavior of households.
Another extension to the basic predictions is related to the role of uncertainty and
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the precautionary motive for saving. Households may choose to hold some assets as a
precaution against negative income shocks. However, when households experience an
increase in wealth, this will lead the value of their “buffer-stock” of wealth to rise and
will allow such households to increase their spending.
In the standard life-cycle view, it is argued that housing and financial wealth effects
are about the same in the long-run. However, this argument is being challenged with the
idea that housing and financial wealth may have different implications for spending. One
of the reasons why the effects could differ is that housing wealth is considered less liquid
than financial wealth because of the high transaction costs with trading in the housing
market. As homeowners are less likely to liquidate their houses in response to a house
price increase, the housing wealth effect on consumption tends to be smaller than the
financial wealth effect.
Another key difference results from the bequest motive which is more important for
housing wealth. For many households, homeownership may be an end in itself due to the
physiological value they attach to the housing asset and their intent to leave their houses
as bequests. Such homeowners who plan to live in their house also obtain a service from
their homes in addition to using their housing assets to accumulate wealth. For them,
a rise in the price of their housing assets may make them to feel wealthier, but this is
not automatically followed by a rise in their consumer spending as the implicit cost of
consuming housing has also increased and they still need housing services in the future.1
Also, many homeowners usually appear to be reluctant to trade down into less expensive
houses. Furthermore, for those who intend to buy a house or who are renters, there will
be a negative effect on their wealth as a result of rising house prices. The net housing
wealth effect would depend on the relative share of these categories of population and
1. Buiter (2008) discusses the wealth effect of the housing asset in some detail. He assumes that housing
wealth is the present discounted value of the consumption of future housing services. He concludes
that housing has no wealth effect on consumption and house prices can affect consumption only
through (1) redistribution effects if the marginal propensity to spend out of wealth differs between
those long housing and those short housing and (2) collateral or credit effects due to the collateralis-
ability of housing wealth.
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the relative size of their responses to changes in house prices; thus, housing wealth could
be more ambiguous and potentially weaker as compared to the financial wealth effect.
One other reason for a moremodest effect of housing wealth on consumption relative
to that of financial wealth relies on the idea that changes in stock prices more clearly
indicates future increases in a country’s productivity potential whereas a rise in house
prices may be experienced simply due to supply-side constraints which clearly does not
indicate that the overall economy is better off (Mishkin, 2007).
Despite these theoretical arguments which suggest a smaller impact of housing wealth
on consumption, several empirical studies have found greater consumption effects of
housing wealth. One of the reasons behind these findings is the above mentioned collat-
eral effect. Since housing is by far the most important collateral asset for most households
due to the more evenly spread homeownership compared to the ownership of financial
assets which is highly concentrated in a certain population segment, housing wealth can
have stronger impacts on consumption. Moreover, as changes in house prices are much
less volatile than changes in stock prices, the housing wealth effect tends to be more
permanent than financial wealth effect; thus, its impact on spending could be relatively
greater.
2.2 Theoretical Background
The key theoretical link between wealth and consumption, the so-called lifecycle model
developed by Ando and Modigliani (1963) suggests that households use their wealth to
keep their consumption in its planned level. However, it is crucial to solve the nature of
the contemporaneous correlation between changes in wealth and consumption in order
to assess the long-run implications of changes in asset prices.
Following Campbell and Mankiw (1989), Lettau-Ludvigson (2001) first formalized
the idea that consumption, income and wealth move together in the long run. They for-
mulated the standard budget constraint of the consumer in a log linear form and showed
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that if consumption growth and returns on wealth are stationary, then the log con-
sumption, wealth and labor income should be cointegrated. Following Lettau-Ludvigson
(2001), we present the theoretical framework of this cointegration with the accumulation
of wealth equation, in other words the budget constraint:
Wt+1 = (1+Rw,t+1)(Wt −Ct ) (2.1)
where Wt is aggregate wealth, Ct is consumption and Rw,t is the net return on ag-
gregate wealth. Campbell and Mankiw (1989) showed that if the consumption to wealth
ratio is stationary, taking the first Taylor approximation of this equation gives the follow-
ing;
∆wt+1 ≈ k + rw,t+1+ (1− 1/pw)(ct −wt ) (2.2)
where lowercase letters denote log variables, pw = 1− exp(c −w), k is a constant and
r = log(1+ R). Solving this equation forward, the consumption wealth ratio may be
written as;
ct −wt =
∞∑
i=1
p i
w
(rw,t+i −∆ct+i ) (2.3)
We can also take this term’s conditional expectation and express it as;
ct −wt = Et
∞∑
p i
w
i=1
(rw,t+i −∆ct+i ) (2.4)
Total wealth can be written as;
Wt = F Wt +Yt +HWt (2.5)
where F W is the financial wealth, Yt is the human wealth and HWt is the housing
wealth. Since human wealth is unobservable, labor income or disposable income are used
10
as a proxy in the literature. Thus, we can approximate the logarithm of wealth as follows:
wt = γ f wt +θyt + (1− γ −θ)hwt (2.6)
where γ ,θ and (1− γ − θ) are respectively the steady state shares of financial wealth
(F W /W ), disposable income (Y /W ) and housing wealth (HW /W ) in total wealth.
Then, return to aggregate wealth can be expressed as
(1+Rw,t+1) = γ (1+R f w,t+1)+θ(1+Ry,t+1)+ (1− γ −θ)(1+Rhw,t+1) (2.7)
where RWt is the return of total wealth, RF Wt is the return of financial wealth, RYt
is the return of human wealth and RHWt is the return of housing wealth. Taking logs of
both sides and linearizing around the means give;
r wt = γ r f wt +θr yt + (1− γ −θ)r hwt (2.8)
If we insert Equations (2.6) and (2.8) to the Equation (2.4), we get;
ct−γ f wt−θyt−(1−γ−θ)hwt = Et
∞∑
p i
w
i=1
(γ r f wt+i+θr yt+i+(1−γ−θ)r hwt+i−∆ct+i )
(2.9)
The equation above shows that the consumption to wealth ratio (left hand side of the
equation) is a function of expected returns and expected changes in consumption (right
hand side of the equation). We can assume that consumption growth (∆ct+i ) and the real
returns of the wealth components (r f wt+i , r yt+i and r hwt+i ) are stationary. Since the
right hand side of the equation is presumed stationary, the consumption to wealth ratio
should also follow a stationary path, in other words, consumption and wealth should be
cointegrated. It is important to note that the consumption to wealth ratio changes in the
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short run according to the expected changes in the right hand side variables. However,
this equation does not tell us whether consumption or wealth changes in the long run for
the correction of the long run disequilibrium.
2.3 Estimation Methodology
Following Lettau-Ludvigson (2001), recent macroeconomic studies have analyzed the
consumption function using logarithmic approximation of the budget constraint and
searched for the cointegration relationship between consumption, income and wealth
that is shown in Equation (2.9). The steady state share coefficients γ and θ in the equa-
tion also give the long run elasticities of consumption with respect to different forms of
wealth. This in turn helps to derive the marginal propensity from the given values.
In the short run, it is more likely to have some deviations from the long-run rela-
tionship. Thus, the system moves to restore the equilibrium. In order to investigate the
short-run dynamics that include the variables’ adjustments to restore the long run equi-
librium and the time taken in this process, the Engle-Granger single equation estimation
method (ECM) is often used by researchers.
The Engle-Granger approach is applied in two steps. In the first step, the long run re-
lationship is identified. Using this long run relationship in the second step as one of
the regressors, a short run function of one of the endogenous variables is estimated.
In the literature, the Engle-Granger method is used to estimate the consumption func-
tion by assuming that both income and wealth variables are weakly exogenous. In other
words, it is assumed that only consumption is affected from the disequilibrium and it
performs the adjustment while income and wealth do not. However, this is not always
the case and it is also not supported by the theoretical framework (Lettau and Ludvigson,
2001). Equation (2.9) gives no guidance about how the adjustment occurs. If in reality,
income and/or wealth in addition to consumption are affected from the disequilibrium,
the Engle-Granger approach is likely to suffer from simultaneity. For this reason, rather
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than the Engle-Granger method, we should use a framework that allows for the possibil-
ity that any or all variables perform this adjustment. Thus, we assume that all variables
are endogenous and estimate them in a system of equations, namely the VECM.
2.3.1 Johansen (1988) Estimation Procedure
In order to formulate the VECM, first we write the VAR model assuming that the
VAR(m) model only contains m endogenous I(1) variables;
yt =µ1yt−1+µ2yt−2+ .....+µkyt−k + ǫt (2.10)
where "ǫt"s are unobservable i.i.d. zero mean white noises with ǫi t ∼ (0,σ
2
ǫi t
) and
Σǫt ǫ′t
= V . The model can be reparameterized by subtracting yt−1 from both sides. By
rearranging them, we get the following VAR model;
∆yt =Πyt−1+Γ1∆yt−1+ ....Γp+1∆yt−p+1+ ǫt (2.11)
where Π=
p∑
i=1
µi − Im and Γi =−
p∑
j=i+1
µ j .
If there are stationary linear combinations of the m endogenous non-stationary vari-
ables, in other words, if the non-stationary variables are cointegrated, then;
|Im −µ1λ
1−µ2λ
2− ....−µkλ
k |= 0 (2.12)
for λ= 1. Since the endogenous variables are cointegrated, then the rank(Π)= r < m,
thus, Π can be decomposed as α, adjustment coefficients, and β, cointegration coeffi-
cients, where both are mx r full column rank matrices. Thus, the model can be reinter-
preted as VECM where cointegration relationship β
′
yt−1 (error correction term) is one
of the regressors in the system;
∆yt = αβ
′
yt−1+Γ1∆yt−1+ ....Γp+1∆yt−p+1+ ǫt (2.13)
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The variables in β show the long-run relationships among the endogenous variables
whereas α measures the impact of deviations from this long-run equilibrium in the short
term. Π can be estimated from Equation (2.11) directly by using OLS. However, in order
to estimate the elements of Π; α and β separately, we need to have some identifying
restrictions. In this regard, we follow Johansen (1988, 1991) by using the restrictions that
β includes eigenvectors, in other words, the cointegrating vectors that are orthogonal to
each other.
In Johansen’s algorithm two set of regressions are estimated;
∆yt =
ˆ
Π0+
ˆ
Π1∆yt−1+
ˆ
Π2∆yt−2+ .....+
ˆ
Πp−1∆yt−p+1+
ˆ
u t (2.14)
yt−1 =
ˆ
Ψ0+
ˆ
Ψ1∆yt−1+
ˆ
Ψ2∆yt−2+ .....+
ˆ
Ψp−1∆yt−p+1+
ˆ
v t (2.15)
where
ˆ
Πiand
ˆ
Ψidenotes (nxn) matrices of OLS coefficient estimates. Next step is to
calculate the sample variance-covariance matrices of the OLS residuals
ˆ
u t and
ˆ
v t ;
ˆ
Σuu = (1/T )
T∑
t=1
ˆ
u t
ˆ
u
′
t
(2.16)
ˆ
Σvv = (1/T )
T∑
t=1
ˆ
v t
ˆ
v
′
t
(2.17)
ˆ
Σuv =
ˆ
Σvu = (1/T )
T∑
t=1
ˆ
u t
ˆ
v
′
t
(2.18)
From these variance-covariance matrices, the eigenvalues of the matrix
ˆ
Σ
−1
vv
ˆ
Σvu
ˆ
Σ
−1
uu
ˆ
Σuv (2.19)
are found with the eigenvalues ordered. After these calculations, maximum likelihood
estimates of the parameters (e.g. α and β) can be derived.
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2.3.2 Estimation of the Cointegrating Vector under the Structural Break
As known, the cointegration approach comes from the log-linear approximation to the
consumer’s intertemporal budget constraint that we have written before as
ct − γ f wt −θyt − (1− γ −θ)hwt ≈ 0 (2.20)
where γ ,θ and (1 − γ − θ) are respectively the steady state shares of financial
wealth, disposable income and housing wealth in total wealth. As seen, this equation
is preference-free since it is derived simply from the budget constraint. In order to have a
stationary consumption-wealth ratio, some fundamental parameters that determine this
cointegration relationship should not change permanently over the time frame for which
the relationship is examined. However, if there are major changes in some of those funda-
mental parameters such as taxes, productivity growth, demographics, financial structure,
etc., the theory implies no such stability.2 Thus, such breaks may lead to misspecification
of the long-run properties of a system and may result in an inadequate estimation.
The Johansen (1988)model we discussed above does not include a potential shift in the
cointegration vector. If there is a break between the varibles in the cointegration vector,
we should estimate that cointegration vector with another framework that accounts for a
break. Andrade et al. (2005) deals with this type of a problem in the context of a one-time
change in the cointegration vector at a known date. Along the lines of Johansen (1988),
they rewrote the model in the following form;
∆yt = 1t¶t0[α0β
′
0
yt−1]+1t>t0[α1β
′
1
(yt−1− yt0)]+Γ1∆yt−1+ ....Γp+1∆yt−p+1+ǫt (2.21)
whete t0 is the date of break which does not occur at the limit points of the sample
and, 1t¶t0 and 1t>t0 determines the regime that currently runs at date t . When estimat-
2. Turkish economy was introduced a comprehansive economic reform program in 2001Q2.
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ing the cointegration vector, Andrade et al. (2005) distinguished two cases; in the first
one, only the loading coefficients are unchanged across two regimes whereas in the sec-
ond case, the loading coefficients and the cointegration space may both change. In their
algorithm, three set of regressions are estimated;
∆yt =
ˆ
Π0+
ˆ
Π1∆yt−1+
ˆ
Π2∆yt−2+ .....+
ˆ
Πp−1∆yt−p+1+
ˆ
u t (2.22)
1t¶t0yt−1 =
ˆ
Ψ0+
ˆ
Ψ1∆yt−1+
ˆ
Ψ2∆yt−2+ .....+
ˆ
Ψp−1∆yt−p+1+
ˆ
v t (2.23)
1t>t0[yt−1− yt0] =
ˆ
Υ0+
ˆ
Υ1∆yt−1+
ˆ
Υ2∆yt−2+ .....+
ˆ
Υp−1∆yt−p+1+
ˆ
µt (2.24)
where
ˆ
Πi ,
ˆ
Ψiand
ˆ
Υidenote (nxn) matrices of OLS coefficient estimates.
First Case: Cointegration Vector Changes while Loading Coefficients do not
Change In the first case, where the loading coefficients do not change, the residuals
in Equation (2.22) are regressed by the residuals in Equations (2.23) and (2.24) in order to
get the
ˆ
εt , estimate of the error term in Equation (2.21);
ˆ
u t = αnx1[β
′
0
β
′
1
]1x2n


ˆ
v t
ˆ
µt


2nxT
+
ˆ
εt t = 1,2....,T (2.25)
Next step is to calculate the sample variance-covariance matrices of all these OLS
residuals
ˆ
u t ,
ˆ
v t ,
ˆ
µt and
ˆ
εt ;
ˆ
Σεε = (1/T )
T∑
t=1
ˆ
εt
ˆ
εt (2.26)
ˆ
Σuu = (1/T )
T∑
t=1
ˆ
u t
ˆ
u t (2.27)
ˆ
Σuv = (1/T )
t0∑
t=1
ˆ
u t
ˆ
v t (2.28)
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ˆΣuµ = (1/T )
T∑
t=t0+1
ˆ
u t
ˆ
µt (2.29)
ˆ
Σvv = (1/T )
t0∑
t=1
ˆ
v t
ˆ
v t (2.30)
ˆ
Σµµ = (1/T )
T∑
t=t0+1
ˆ
µt
ˆ
µt (2.31)
From these variance-covariance matrices, we find the eigenvalues of the matrix
ˆ
Σ
−1/2
εε

ˆ
Σuv

ˆ
Σvv
−1 ˆ
Σ
′
uv
+
ˆ
Σuµ

ˆ
Σµµ
−1 ˆ
Σ
′
uµ

ˆ
Σ
−1/2
εε
(2.32)
with the eigenvalues ordered. After these calculations, maximum likelihood estimates
of the parameters (e.g. α,β0,β1) can be derived.
Second Case: Both Cointegration Vector and Loading Coefficients Change In the
second case, different from the first case, the residuals in Equation (2.22) are regressed by
the residuals in Equations (2.23) and (2.24) separately for the two regimes in order to get
the
ˆ
εt , estimate of the error term in Equation (2.21);
ˆ
u t = α0β
′
0
ˆ
v t +
ˆ
εt t = 1,2, ..t0 (2.33)
ˆ
u t = α1β
′
1
ˆ
µt +
ˆ
εt t = t0+ 1, ..T (2.34)
From the calculated variance-covariance matrices in Equations (2.26)-(2.31), the eigen-
values of the matrix
ˆ
Σ0
−1/2
uu
ˆ
Σuv

ˆ
Σvv
−1 ˆ
Σ
′
uv
ˆ
Σ0
−1/2
uu
(2.35)
are found for the estimation of α0 and β0 , and the eigenvalues of the matrix
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ˆΣ1
−1/2
uu
ˆ
Σuµ

ˆ
Σµµ
−1 ˆ
Σ
′
uµ
ˆ
Σ1
−1/2
uu
(2.36)
are found for the estimation of α1 andβ1 where
∑ˆ0
uu
is the variance-covariance matrix
of the period t ¶ t0 and
∑ˆ1
uu
is the variance-covariance matrix for the period t > t0.
2.4 Empirical Literature on Turkey
While there is growing need to test the link between housing wealth and consumption
in Turkey, the relevant literature is sparse. One of the main limitations of research on
Turkey is the lack of data on house prices.
Among the few empirical studies that attempted to incorporate housing wealth in
consumption function for Turkey, Akkoyunlu (2002) employed the Engle-Granger single
equation estimation using annual data for the period of 1962-1994. In order to approx-
imate the real house prices, Akkoyunlu (2002) used the private housing investment and
housing stock and assumed that real house prices increased 3.25 percent per annum for
the entire period of the study. Thus, her analysis is based on a constant real increase in
housing prices, which clearly does not reflect a realistic view for such a long period since
Turkey had encountered a number of deep economic crises during that period. The study
found that housing wealth has a significant effect on consumption expenditure in Turkey,
although it is marginal compared to financial wealth effect which is approximated with
the M2/GNP ratio.
In a similar strand of research as Akkoyunlu (2002), Ozer and Tang (2009) recently
estimated the consumption function via Engle-Granger single equation estimation and
studied the financial and housing wealth effects on aggregate private consumption in
Turkey for the period of 1987-2007. Their study employed a proxy for housing wealth
by constructing a quarterly housing price index as a weighted average of the housing in-
vestment deflator and the lagging rental price index and by multiplying this price index
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by the housing stock series. The study’s findings are that disposable income is the major
factor determining private consumption in Turkey, with elasticity over 0.90 and both fi-
nancial wealth and housing wealth have positive effects on consumption, with elasticities
of 0.077 and 0.046 respectively while there is not enough evidence to show that one effect
is stronger than the other.
Another recent study that analyzed financial and housing wealth effects on consump-
tion for Turkey was conducted by Binay and Salman (2008) for the period of 1990-2005.
They used the percentage change in rent price index as a proxy for housing wealth with-
out taking the dwelling stock into consideration, which is widely accepted as an impor-
tant driver of housing wealth in Turkey. The estimation by Binay and Salman (2008) is
based on a simple consumption equation by least square estimator through which they
found that housing wealth has a significant effect on total consumption, with an elasticity
of 0.2 while financial wealth has no significant effect on total consumption.
In another recent study, Aydede (2008) analyzed the unfunded social security system’s
effect on consumption for Turkey and used a single equation estimation introducing in-
strumental variables. In the study, the link between housing wealth and consumption is
also analyzed by using the rental income from dwellings as a proxy of housing wealth.
However, this proxy includes only dwellings that provide rental income for their own-
ers; thus, it only measures the benefit stream of a particular form of housing asset rather
than the stock value of all housing assets. The study suggested that housing wealth has
a sizeable positive effect on consumption whereas the financial effect on consumption is
negative (possibly due to increased savings).
Differing from the methods in the afore mentioned studies, Akin (2008) looked at
the consumption effects of stock market, housing wealth and financial wealth by estimat-
ing a VECM by using quarterly time series data for the 1987-2006 period. Akin (2008)
constructed a housing wealth series considering residential floor area costs as a proxy for
the house prices. However, it is seen that Akin’s measure does not include the cost of
land, which is an important factor that drives house prices. Akin (2008) suggested that
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in the long run, housing wealth has a positive effect on the non-durables consumption
(0.27 percent) in contrast to durables consumption. On the other hand, she found that
stock market wealth does not have a significant long-run effect on consumption of non-
durables, but has strong effect on the durables consumption. Looking at the short-run,
Akin (2008) found that while housing wealth has negative effect on non-durables con-
sumption, stock market wealth and financial wealth have positive effects on consumption
of both durables and non-durables.
Among all previous studies covering the period after 2001, the effect of a structural
change in Turkish economy is ignored and it is assumed that the cointegration relation-
ship between consumption and wealth components remained stable over the time frame
for which the relationship is examined. However, in case of major changes in some of
those fundamental parameters in the economy such as taxes, productivity growth, de-
mographics, financial structure, etc., the theory implies no such stability. In fact, these
major changes may lead to misspecification of the long-run properties of a system and re-
sult in an inadequate estimation. Thus, as in the case of the 2001 crisis, if there is a break
between the variables in the cointegration vector, we should estimate that cointegration
vector with an improved framework that takes the break into consideration.
Also, in all of the reviewed studies, the simultaneous relationship between consump-
tion and wealth is generally not accounted for, except in the study by Akin (2008).
In other words, by using methods other than VECM, most studies assumed that only
consumption performs the disequilibrium adjustment while income and wealth do not.
However, this assumption does not have theoretical support since it is widely accepted
that income and wealth also perform the disequilibrium adjustment (Lettau and Ludvig-
son, 2004). Following the theoretical framework, our study aims to analyze the con-
sumption effect of housing wealth and financial wealth with the VECM.
In this paper, we employed a different approach from Akin (2008) with regard to
the proxy for housing prices. Instead of using residential floor area costs as a proxy for
housing prices, we chose to use the Rent Price Index (RPI) which is published by the
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Statistics Institution of Turkey. (see Figure B.2 for the comparison of two measures)
In order to show that rent price is a reliable proxy for housing prices for Turkey, we
used the monthly real estate price and rent data from Reidin’s Real Estate Index that is
based on sales and rental price levels in the real estate markets of Turkey’s 7 major cities,
71 districts, and their 481 sub districts. This index starts at the beginning of June 2007.
A close look at the Figure B.3 indicates that there is high correlation between the rent
and price data. The correlation coefficient between the percentage changes of these two
variables is 0.89. Binay and Salman (2008) also showed that there is a high correlation
between rent and price data. Using data on house prices and rents for Ankara, the capital
city of Turkey, for the period of 2000-2005Q2 from TURYAP, the largest real estate
broker in Turkey, the authors found that rent prices for Ankara are highly correlated with
house prices for the same city. Thus, we conclude that the rent price index is a good proxy
for house prices for Turkey. However, as mentioned before, Binay and Salman’s (2008)
rent price index does not capture the dwelling stocks’ effect on housing wealth. To deal
with this limitation, this paper introduces the stock data into the index by multiplying
the rent price index by the dwelling stock in order to approximate the housing wealth.
2.5 Empirical Analysis
2.5.1 Background of Turkish Economy
In order to get a fuller understanding and better modeling of private consumption behav-
ior in a country, it is important to look at its macroeconomic background and identify
major economic events which have undeniable impact on household consumption and
saving choices.
In the period over which this analysis is conducted – from 1991Q1 to 2011Q1
Turkey’s economy has undergone fundamental changes. Being a country with histor-
ically high inflation rates and a constant public sector deficit, Turkey has experimented
with many reform policies to lower inflation and further liberalize and stabilize the econ-
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omy.
The financial crises in 1994 and 2001 as well as the Russian crisis in 1998 were the
three major turmoils that affected the Turkish economy. During the early 1990s, in the
debt financing of Turkey’s high public sector deficit, banks heavily involved in short-term
borrowing in foreign currency and the size of their open currency positions got larger.
This trend shortened maturity of domestic debt and increased the vulnerability of the fi-
nancial market causing an upward pressure on real interest rates and the cost of financing
of public debt. In such a vulnerable financial structure, in 1994, the government decided
to cancel the Treasury’s domestic public debt auctions in order to lower interest rates
and prevent further rises in cost of servicing the domestic debt. Instead of domestic debt
financing, the government relied upon the Central Bank resources in financing the public
deficit. Coupled with the downgrading of Turkey’s credit rating, this caused turbulence
in exchange rate markets and the banking sector that had taken substantial open currency
positions went into crisis. With increased uncertainty due to the banking crisis, public
rushed into foreign currency, and as a result, the Turkish Lira depreciated sharply. As
the Central Bank intervened in the foreign exchange market, its foreign reserves, which
were not high enough to effectively manage the crisis, were rapidly diminished. In order
to prevent further dollarization of the economy, the interest rates were raised, and con-
sequently consumption and investment spending declined substantially, which led the
banking crisis develop into an economic crisis. The government’s announcement of an
unlimited deposit insurance scheme ended the crisis in the banking sector and restored
financial stability.
The Russian default in 1998 had resulted in a massive capital outflow from Turkey as
the country’s equities were in the same basket as Russian equities. The outflow led to
higher interest rates, larger fiscal deficit, credit shortages and a fall in industrial produc-
tion. Also, the decrease in Russian demand for Turkish exports further deteriorated the
country’s industrial performance.
Following the Russian crisis, another radical shift in capital outflows in 2001 was
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triggered by liquidity problems in the banking sector and the political fight between the
president and the prime minister. Different from other crises observed in the past, the
2001 crisis brought about substantial changes in Turkey’s political and economic systems,
and led to the introduction of significant structural reforms and programs. With a view
to gain a good understanding of these changes and their implications, it would be useful
to summarize why and how the crisis developed.
Basically, there are three main factors that are responsible for the 2001 crisis. The first
one is the high public deficit financed by monetization. As a result of very high levels
of public deficits and budget deficits in the 1990s, the debt stock saw a rapid increase. Fi-
nancing this debt through monetary expansion resulted in a hyperinflation-like process.
The uncertainty of such an inflationary period and high government spending away from
fiscal discipline created short-maturity debt and increases in interest rates which led to a
debt-interest rate spiral.
Another factor underlying the crisis is the heightened level of risk observed in finan-
cial markets and the increased vulnerability of the banking system. In a system of pegged
exchange rates and control policies, banks took excessive risk with their open currency
positions and this led to a more fragile financial system. In addition to that, the maturity
structure of capital flows remained short due to uncertainty in such a high inflationary
period, and combined with this, the large duty losses of public banks that were financing
discretionary political spending inevitably increased the vulnerability of the system.
At this point, considering its relevance to households’ consumption functions, it is
noteworthy to mention that prior to the 2001 crisis, the banking sector’s main func-
tion of financing the private sector was affected negatively and the private sector credits
remained very low in banks’ actives. Instead, the banking sector used its resources to
finance the short-maturity public debt.3
The third main factor behind the 2001 crisis is the unstable political landscape that
3. Data is available at "evds.tcmb.gov.tr" and "www.hazine.gov.tr"
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is viewed to have a large influence on the economy. Prior to the crisis, from 1991 to
2001, multi-party coalition governments had been the norm and the average life of these
coalition governments were only 16 months compared to 5 years (60 months) after the
2001 period. On February 19th 2001, at the time of weakening economic fundamentals,
Turkey’s last coalition government faced a severe political crisis as a public dispute be-
tween Turkey’s Prime Minister and President over the fight against corruption escalated
and the PrimeMinister made a media announcement that the Turkish state faced “serious
crisis”. This political tension caused panic in financial markets and triggered a financial
crisis. With the run to foreign currency, the Central Bank lost a large share of its re-
serves and the payment system was locked as the Turkish Lira liquidity decreased and the
public banks that had high daily liquidity needs faced a liquidity crisis. Due to these pres-
sures in the financial market, the exchange rate targeting strategy was abandoned and the
Turkish Lira was allowed to float freely against foreign currencies as of February 22nd ,
2001. During the year of the crisis, Turkey’s economy experienced a 9.5 per cent con-
traction. Subsequent to such a severe recession, the so-called "Strengthening the Turkish
Economy" economic reform program was introduced. With the introduction of struc-
tural reforms and programs after the crisis, the economy started to grow rapidly, political
influence on markets got reduced and the macro economy gained more stability.
Since the reform programs changed the Turkish economy substantially, it is worth to
give an overview and analyze their impact on the economy briefly. One of the most im-
portant reform areas was the independence of the Central Bank that restructured the re-
lationship between politics and economy. Before 2001, a dependant monetary authority
followed politics that helped the financing of the Treasury; therefore, during this period,
political institutions had a large influence on the economy. The CB independence after
the crisis ended the institutional relationship between the government and the Central
Bank which is an important step in weakening political influence on the economy and
lowering inflation.
In addition to the CB independence, there were new laws and regulations on the
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restructuring of the banking sector. First of all, a domestic debt swap was launched in or-
der to ensure an easy liquidity for the Treasury and to lower the risk of banks by closing
the banks’ open currency positions. These steps taken to strengthen the fiscal environ-
ment were combined with legislative and operational regulations on the transparency
and the effective supervision of the system. In this context, the Banking Regulation and
Supervision Agency, which was established not long before the crisis, was activated and
authorized as the sole authority in the banking sector. Through this independent institu-
tion, it was aimed to ensure auditing and regulating of the banks. Under the new system,
regulations were launched to closely control the banks for excessive risk taking and their
open currency positions. Reforms also covered the state banks, and the practice of duty
losses of the state banks due to political spending was ended. Instead, the duties given
to the state banks have become items of the governmental budget. Moreover, some state
banks merged and some of them were liquidated. These changes also played significant
roles in weakening the political influence on the economy, and as a result, it reduced the
economic uncertainty.
Parallel to the above-mentioned steps, a tight monetary policy and fiscal policy were
implemented. The CB announced to follow first the implicit and then the explicit infla-
tion targeting framework. On the fiscal policy aspect, very high primary surplus targets
were announced and in order to achieve the targets, regulations were established on vari-
ous areas in relation to taxation and public spending.
The economic reform program after the 2001 crisis was fruitful to a great extent. The
inflation rate that was about 60 percent before the crisis declined rapidly and by 2004,
a single-digit inflation was achieved for the first time in decades. With the confidence
redeveloped in TL, the currency reform of dropping six zeros from the Turkish Lira
was introduced. As a result of increased macroeconomic and financial stability combined
with the prospect of EU membership and the positive international conjuncture, capi-
tal inflows soared, and consequently, the maturity structure of the debt stock improved
significantly. The average maturity of government debt increased from 148 days in 2001
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to 550 days in 2010.4 The positive trend in the economy in the post-crisis period also
improved the political stability and the short term coalition governments were replaced
with single party governments ruling for longer periods.
The increased capital inflows supported by improved public trust and confidence due
to the economic and political stability after 2001 led the banking system, which is grow-
ing fast and becoming more liquid, to offer greater resources to the private sector. While
the share of consumer credits in banks’ actives was only 8 percent in 2001, this rate
reached to 38 percent, and in real terms, the consumer credits increased by 315 times.5
Considering all the abovementioned developments in Turkey’s economy, the con-
sumption function may have been changed in the post-crisis period compared to the pe-
riod before 2001. Thus, the possibility of such a structural change in consumption should
be taken into consideration.
2.5.2 Data
The variables introduced in this empirical model of consumption are the main ones sug-
gested by the theoretical framework: total consumption, disposable income, financial
wealth and housing wealth. Our data set is quarterly series and it covers the period from
1991Q1 to 2011Q1. All the variables in the study are converted into real per capita values
and transformed into a natural logarithm.
The total consumption variable, denoted by CON, is measured by private consump-
tion expenditure derived from GDP series. The disposable income, denoted by DPI,
is taken as a proxy of labor income. The net financial wealth, denoted by FW, is con-
structed from the sum of M2Y and stocks subtracted by total consumer credits including
credit cards. Finally, the net housing wealth series, denoted by HW, are computed by
4. Author’s own calculations is based on data from the Undersecretariat of Treasury in Turkey, available
at "www.hazine.gov.tr".
5. Author’s own calculations are based on data from the Central Bank of Turkey, available at
"evds.tcmb.gov.tr".
26
multiplying the house price index, which is derived from rent price index (RPI), with the
net dwelling stock, and by subtracting total housing credits from the result. All series
are deflated by a private consumption expenditure deflator derived from the GDP series
(see Figure B.4). Detailed description of the data is given in Appendix C. Since CON and
DPI series show strong seasonal patterns, we filter both series by Census X12.
In order to take into consideration the crises of 1994, 1998, 2001 and the U.S. mort-
gage crisis in 2007, we introduce 5 impulse dummies for 1994Q2, 1998Q3, 2001Q1,
2001Q2 and 2008Q1.
As it is seen from Table A.2, the ADF test shows that none of the variables are sta-
tionary in levels, whereas all variables are stationary in their first differences. We also
conduct a modified ADF test proposed by Lanne et al. (2002) to account for the possibil-
ity of any structural break in data. Critical values are taken from Lanne et al. (2002). As
it is seen from the Table A.2, the modified ADF test also shows that none of the variables
are stationary in levels, which is parallel to the standard ADF test results, whereas all
variables are stationary in their first differences. In conclusion, the evidence of unit root
in our variables is found to be strong once we allow for the existence of structural break
in our data.
Since all our variables are well represented by I(1) processes, the next step is to search
for the cointegration properties of the data and parameterize them in a multivariate
model.
2.5.3 Testing for Cointegration
A precondition for cointegration testing and formulation of VECM is that all variables
must be non-stationary and integrated of order one I(1). Our ADF test results showed
that the integration for all variables was found to be I(1).
The first step of the multivariate analysis to be conducted with the I(1) variables is to
investigate the cointegration properties of these data to see whether there exist a long-run
relationship within the system. If a cointegration vector is detected, than it is optimal to
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use this information by using VECM.
In cointegration testing and formulation of a VECM, it is first necessary to determine
the appropriate lag. To determine the appropriate lag structure (p), we write the unstruc-
tured VAR(p) of our model in levels that includes the break (represented by shift and
slope dummies) and choose the value for "p" which minimizes the information criteria
and can pass from the diagnostic tests. The choice of the maximum lag length may de-
termine the optimum lag, which in turn can affect the cointegration test results. Fitting
6th or higher order lag implies that too many degrees of freedom are lost; thus, we use
5th order as the maximum lag length in the analysis. The SC (Schwarz Criterion), HQ
(Hannan-Quinn information criterion) and AIC (Akaike’s information criterion) suggest
1, 2 and 4 lags in levels respectively. Values for the information criteria are reported in
Table A.3. We also estimate two VAR(p)s for the sub-samples which are 1991Q1-2000Q4
and 2001Q2-2011Q1. All information criteria give 1 to 3 lags for both periods. We base
our final choice of the lag length on the criterion which gives us the absence of serial
correlation in the residuals. As a result, we use the AIC and select the lag length as 4.6
Having determined the appropriate lag length, the next step requires testing for coin-
tegration among the endogenous variables. The cointegration properties of the I(1) vari-
ables are investigated in a multivariate system by using Saikkonen and Lutkepohl test
(Saikkonen and Lutkepohl, 2000), which is robust to structural break in the cointegra-
tion vector, and also employing the Johansen Trace test (Johansen, 1991 and Johansen et
al., 2000).7 It is shown by Andrade et al. (2005) that Johansen Trace test performs well
under the structural break even for small samples. Table A.4 displays the results of the
6. Our VECM results do not change much with the lag selection.
7. We did two kind of Trace tests developed by Johansen (1991, 2000). One of them is a classic Trace test
(Johansen, 1991) that does not consider any structural break. The second one, explained in Johansen
(2000), is the modified Trace test that includes the structural break concept referring to a level shift
in the cointegration vector. Since the critical values of the Johansen test (1991) do not include exoge-
nous variables, except the trend and the constant, we should simulate the new critical values for the
cointegration test that accounts for a structural break. In our analysis, the critical values as well as the
p-values of all Johansen trace tests are obtained by computing the respective response surface according
to Johansen et al. (2000) by using JMulti.
28
tests.
According to the results of the both tests, there is one cointegrating relationship be-
tween consumption, income, financial wealth and housing wealth at the 5% significance
level. This result is also robust under different lag specifications.
2.5.4 Estimation Results
First, the cointegration vector is previously estimated without any break using the
method of Johansen (1981). However, various tests including the Break Point Chow
test shows a break in 2001Q1; therefore the stability conditions could not be satisfied for
the estimation and Johansen’s method becomes not applicable to Turkey for the period
of study. Even including a shift dummy into the cointegration vector does not solve the
problem. Thus, we suggest that there is a break in the relationship between the variables
in the cointegration vector, which is also shown in our ECM estimation results discussed
before. As a result, we choose to implement the Andrade et al. (2005) method that ac-
counts for this type of a break. As we mentioned above, Andrade et al. (2005) distinguish
two cases; in the first one, only the loading coefficients are unchanged across two regimes
whereas in the second case, the loading coefficients and the cointegration space may both
change. The results of our estimations based on Andrade et al. (2005) for each case are
displayed in Table A.5 and Table A.6. According to our estimations, we get the long-run
consumption functions reported in Table A.11.
We see from Table A.11 that after 2001, the effect of income decreases whereas the
effect of housing wealth moves in opposite direction. In order to check whether the
estimated coefficients in the equations are different from zero or not, Likelihood-ratio
(LR) tests are performed on the coefficients of the cointegrating vector and on the loading
coefficients . Tables A.7 and A.8 display the results of the tests. The LR test results
indicate that the coefficient estimates of the financial wealth after 2001 and the housing
wealth before 2001 are not significantly different than zero for the estimations for both
cases where loading coefficients change and do not change. Other coefficients in the
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cointegrating vector are all significantly different than zero for both periods and both
cases.
It is also seen that the loading coefficient of the error correcting terms for the change
in consumption is negative and this coefficient is significant for both cases and for each
period. The loading coefficient of the housing wealth is positive and significant for both
estimations and periods, except for the second case before 2001. As for the loading coeffi-
cient of income, it is negative and significant only for the second case before 2001. These
results indicate that after 2001, deviations from the long-run equilibrium are adjusted by
both consumption and housing wealth in the next period. As an other interpretation
of these findings, the cointegration vector helps to predict not only consumption, but
also the housing wealth growth in Turkey. Thus, our results show that in order to re-
frain from the simultaneity bias, the long-run consumption function in Turkey should
be estimated with a system approach rather than a single equation method.
Following the LR test results, we re-estimate the VECM in a restricted form. Ac-
cording to the results of our estimations displayed in Tables A.13 and A.14, we get the
consumption functions reported in Table A.12.
As it is seen from the restricted VECMestimation results, there is not much difference
between the estimations where loading coefficients change and do not change. Thus, we
interpret only the first estimation results. Before 2001, the estimated income elasticity
of the consumption function is 0.83. In other words, a permanent one percent increase
in real per-capita disposable income is associated with a 0.83 percent increase in real per-
capita consumption in the long-run. For the same period, financial wealth also has a
positive effect on consumption with the elasticity of 0.13. However, housing wealth has
no significant effect on consumption before 2001.
On the other hand, after 2001, income elasticity of the consumption decreases dra-
matically to 0.30. Thus, the increase in income affects consumption less compared to the
pre-crisis period. This may be explained by an increasing share of consumer credits in
the total banking sector credits after 2001. The previously credit-constrainted consumers
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have become more liquid and thus, they have relied on their income less in making con-
sumption decisions. In the period after 2001, the housing wealth effect becomes signifi-
cant with the elasticity of 0.28. This means that housing wealth has affected consumers’
consumption decisions considerably. This can be explained by the housing wealth’s col-
lateral effect. As we saw in Figure B.1, the housing wealth is used more as a collateral
in the last years. This is an expected trend since the financial deepening and the finan-
cial instruments got stronger in Turkey after the crisis. As for the financial wealth effect
on consumption, it is surprising to find that this effect has become insignificant after
2001. It may be partially due to the changing in the financial wealth’s composition and
its term structure since the interest rates have gradually dropped from double digits to a
single digit value after the crisis. We do not aim to give the details of this composition
here; however, the lowered effect of financial wealth on consumption is clearly a topic for
further empirical work.
For our results to be econometrically valid, our model should satisfy certain condi-
tions in terms of residuals and coefficients. We conduct the diagnostic tests for both the
unrestricted and the restricted VECM, and the results can be seen from Tables A.9-A.10
and A.15-A.16. According to these test results, the residuals of both VECM estimations
satisfy the conditions of normality, autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in all equa-
tions. Therefore, we can conclude that our VECM is robust.
2.6 An Alternative Approach to Estimate Welfare Effects
The literature typically estimates wealth effects employing cointegrating regressions be-
tween consumption, income and wealth. However, according to Carroll (2004), estima-
tions using cointegration analyses are problematic since such analyses assume a long-run
trend in consumption and wealth which implicitly implies that the saving rate should be
stationary. Yet, as he suggests, the saving rate depends on many variables that clearly
change in most of the economies in a short time frame for which the cointegration anal-
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ysis is conducted. Assuming a constant saving rate is found to be problematic also in
the empirical literature recently. (Slacalek 2004) Thus, the cointegration approach suffers
from the omitted variable bias.8
On the other hand, Carroll (2004) also mentions that it is a misidentified question to
search for the long term welfare effects of housing on consumption. It is because a rise in
the house price does not increase the amount of real sources. In other words, increasing
the price of housing asset does not mean an increase in the economy’s ability to produce
non-housing goods. Eventually, consumption goods must equal their production in the
long run, which is not relevant to rise in asset prices. Thus, it is better to analyze or
interpret the effects of housing wealth on consumption in the short or medium term,
rather than the long-term effects.
Thus, Carroll (2004) presents his own new methodology for estimating the short
term and medium term wealth effects on consumption which does not require stability
in cointegrating vectors. He uses the habit formation model (sluggishness of consump-
tion) for describing the consumption function and develops an alternative approach to
estimate the short and medium term MPCs which do not depend on the assumption of
the existence of a long-term stable cointegrating vector.
2.6.1 Estimation Method Developed by Carroll (2004)
Empirical studies show that consumption growth responds sluggishly to shocks. The
sluggishness of consumption growth can be captured in macroeconomic models includ-
ing habit persistence parameters, rather than the random walk models (Hall, 1978).
Therefore, consumption growth can be estimated for a few quarters using models with
habit persistence parameters. Based on this finding, Carroll uses the sluggishness of con-
sumption for describing the consumption function and develops an alternative approach
8. Carroll (2004) suggests that the cointegration regression implies that consumption growth depends
only on its own lags and the lags of wealth while it is well known that some additional variables like
interest rate changes, consumer sentiment, etc. also determine the changes in consumption.
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to estimate the MPC in the short and medium term. Following Carroll (2004), we can
write the utility function of the form
u(C ,H ) =
(C −χH )1−ρ
1−ρ
(2.37)
where χ is sluggishness parameter, H is stock of habits, and the habit stock evolves
according to
Ht+1 = Ht (1−λ)+ (Ct −Ht )λ (2.38)
The Euler equation of this model can be approximated by
∆ logCt+1 = c0+χ∆ logCt + ǫt+1 (2.39)
or today’s consumption change can be written
∆ logCt = c0+χ∆ logCt−1+ ǫt (2.40)
Thus, sluggishness parameter can be get from the estimated serial correlation in con-
sumption growth. ǫt includes all shocks on consumption growth (one of them is wealth
shock). Supposing that the actual measure of consumption contains some transitory mea-
surement error or transitory elements of spending, the measured consumption C ∗ can be
written as
∆ logC ∗
t
=β0+β1∆ logC
∗
t−1+ υt (2.41)
Since β1 is the downward-biased estimate of χ , Sommer (2002) shows that using in-
strumental variables dating t−2 or earlier in this regression should largely overcome this
problem.
Following Carroll (2004) and Jiri (2009), we can write the consumption shocks in the
33
Equation (4) as
ǫt = α1∂ logWt +α2Zt (2.42)
where ∂ logWt =∆ logWt and Zt is other instrumental variables potentially corre-
lated with the consumption growth.
Rather than estimating Equation (2.40) directly we can write the Equation (2.40) as
moving average representation
∆ logCt =
c0
1−χ
+
∞∑
i=1
χ iǫt−i + ǫt (2.43)
and substitute Equation (2.42)’s lagged values into (2.43) gives
∆ logCt =
c0
1−χ
+α1
∞∑
i=1
χ i∂ logWt−i +α2
∞∑
i=1
χ i Zt−i + ǫt (2.44)
Carroll (2004) modifies the Equation (2.40) and uses the ratio of changes in wealth
to an initial level of consumption rather than the wealth growth. Thus, in order
to interpret α1 as the MPC out of wealth we should rescale the consumption with
Ct−5. To estimate this equation, we can approximate the infinite sum of ∂ logWt with
χ (∆Wt−1+ χ∆Wt−2+ χ
2∆Wt−3+ χ
3∆Wt−4)/Ct−5, let’s name W t−1, and the infinite
sum of Zt with χ (Zt−1+ χZt−2+ χ
2Zt−3+ χ
3Zt−4)/Ct−5, let’s name Z t−1. As a result,
we estimate the equation
∂ Ct =
c0
1−χ
+α1W t−1+α2Z t−1+ ǫt (2.45)
where ∂ Ct =∆Ct/Ct−5.
9 Thus, we can get the short runMPC (SMPC) or immediate
MPC out of a change in wealth α1 from this estimation. In addition to that, the medium
term MPC (MMPC) which is the infinite sum of α1
∞∑
i=0
χ i = SM PC/(1− χ ),can also be
9. Since Ct−1 and Ct−5 are highly correlated, ∂ Ct and ∆ logCt is almost perfectly correlated. Thus, we
can use ∂ Ct instead of ∆ logCt .
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calculated. As a result we estimate the MPC out of a change in wealth in two stage; first
we estimate the Equation (2.40) and get χ , then using χ we estimate the Equation (2.44).
2.6.2 Carroll’s Method with Structural Break
Since there is a break in our data, it is better to rewrite the Equations (2.40) and (2.42) in
a form that includes the break;
∆ logCt = c0+ (χ1+ 1t>t0χ2)∆ logCt−1+ ǫt (2.46)
and
ǫt = (α1+ 1t>t0β1)∂ logWt + (α2+ 1t>t0β2)Zt (2.47)
Same as shown above, we can rewrite Equation (2.40) as moving average representa-
tion;
∆ logCt = α0+
t0∑
i=1
χ i
1
ǫt−i +
∞∑
i=t0+1
χ i
2
ǫt−i + ǫt (2.48)
and substituting Equation (2.47)’s lagged values into (2.48) gives;
∆ logCt = α0+ (α1+ 1t>t0β1)

 t0∑
i=1
χ i
1
ǫt−i +
∞∑
i=t0+1
χ i
2
ǫt−i


i=1
∂ logWt−i
+ (α2+ 1t>t0β2)

 t0∑
i=1
χ i
1
ǫt−i +
∞∑
i=t0+1
χ i
2
ǫt−i

Zt−i + ǫt (2.49)
Again, in order to interpret α1( β1) as the MPC out of wealth, we rescale the con-
sumption with Ct−5.
∂ Ct = α0+α1W
1
t−1+α2Z
1
t−1+ 1t>t0β1W
2
t−1+ 1t>t0β2Z
2
t−1+ ǫt (2.50)
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where ∂ Ct = ∆Ct/Ct−5, W
i
t−1 = χi (∆Wt−1 + χi∆Wt−2 + χ
2
i
∆Wt−3 +
χ 3
i
∆Wt−4)/Ct−5 and Z
i
t−1
=χi(Zt−1+χi Zt−2+χ
2
i
Zt−3+χ
3
i
Zt−4)/Ct−5 for i = 1,2.
2.6.3 Estimation Results for Turkey Using Carroll’s Method
According to our estimations, before the break, the sluggishness of consumption is not
different than zero whereas it is 0.32 after the break. In other words, consumption be-
havior before 2001 in Turkey cannot be explained by the sluggishness of consumption
growth models that include habit persistence parameters. Thus, we estimate the period
only after 2001 using Carroll’s method and find the SMPC as 32 kurus and MMPC as
47 kurus for income. In other words, one Turkish Lira (TL) increase in income leads to
32 kurus (100 kurus= 1 TL) short run increase in consumption and it yields a 47 kurus
increase in consumption in the medium term.
For the housing wealth we find SMPC as 1.6 kurus and MMPC as 2 kurus. Although
these MPCs seem small, when the the huge real increase in the housing wealth between
2001Q2-2011Q1 is considered, it can be said that housing wealth also has a considerable
effect on consumption. For example, according to our data, in 2001Q2; housing wealth
is 2.47 million TL in real terms (87=100) and in 2011Q1; it reaches to 6.23 million TL.
Considering the estimated MMPC of 2 kurus in 2001Q2-2011Q1 period, the 3.76 million
TL increase in the housing wealth results in a 0.75 million TL increase in consumption.
This corresponds to 60% of the consumption increase that is seen in the same period.
Lastly, we did not find any significant effect of financial wealth on consumption for
the 2001Q2-2011Q1 period.
It is noteworthy that our findings in Carroll’s method are parallel to the findings of
the cointegration approach.
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2.7 Conclusion
It is now commonly presumed that significant movements in wealth can often have wider
economic impacts in consumer spending. Our study assesses the impact of housing
wealth on aggregate consumer spending in the context of Turkey for the 1991Q1–2011Q1
period by using a system approach which includes the structural break in the cointegra-
tion vector after 2001. The study improves on the methodologies presented in previous
literature, which mostly employed Engle-Granger single equation estimation and ignored
the structural change in Turkish economy after 2001. Having reviewed the earlier meth-
ods to measure housing wealth in the country and their deficiencies, this study also uses
a new measure for housing wealth.
One of the main findings of this study is that disposable income is the major factor
that determines Turkey’s consumption in the long run before 2001. However, this effect
decreases after the 2001 crisis and income elasticity to consumption ratio drops from 0.83
to 0.30 according to our VECM estimations. This may be explained by the increasing
share of consumer credits in the total banking sector credits after 2001. The previously
credit-constrainted consumers have become more liquid and thus, they have relied less
on their income in making consumption decisions.
There is also a considerable change in the housing wealth effect after 2001. Housing
wealth becomes significant with the elasticity of 0.28 after 2001 whereas this effect is not
before 2001. This can be explained by the housing wealth’s collateral effect, meaning that
housing wealth is used more as a collateral couple of years, as seen in Figure B.1.
As for the financial wealth effect on consumption, it is surprising to find that this
effect has become insignificant after 2001. It may be partially due to the huge decrease in
interest rates after 2001. This change in interest rates may have altered the composition
of financial wealth and its term structure and, thus, may have affected the elasticity of
financial wealth in consumption function. The lowered effect of financial wealth on
consumption is clearly a topic for further empirical work.
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Considering that consumption responds to shocks gradually, this study also employs
Carroll et al. (2004)’s methodology based on the sluggishness of aggregate consumption
growth to measure wealth effects. This method distinguishes between immediate (next-
quarter) and eventual wealth effects. According to our alternative estimation, before the
break, the sluggishness of consumption is not different than zero whereas it is 0.32 after
the break. Thus, we estimate the period only after 2001 using Carroll’s method and find
the SMPC as 32 kurus and MMPC as 47 kurus for income. In other words, one Turkish
Lira (TL) increase in income leads to 32 kurus (100 kurus= 1 TL) short run increase in
consumption and it yields a 47 kurus increase in consumption in the medium term.
For the housing wealth, we find SMPC as 1.6 kurus and MMPC as 2 kurus. Al-
though these MPCs seem small, when the the huge real increase in the housing wealth
for 2001Q2-2011Q1 is considered, it can be said that housing wealth also has a consid-
erable effect on consumption. Lastly, we did not find any significant effect of financial
wealth on consumption for the 2001Q2-2011Q1 period.
In the light of the empirical findings and recent developments in Turkey’s financial
sector and housing markets, it is crucial for monetary authority tomonitor developments
in the consumption-wealth link and adopt strategies accordingly. With the recent mort-
gage law that was enacted in 2007 and the continuing financial deepening, which provides
new financial products, the scope for homeowners in Turkey to borrow against housing
collateral may increase over time. Under such a scenario, house prices will tend to rise
and the housing wealth may have even larger impacts upon aggregate spending and the
macroeconomy.
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Chapter 3
House Prices and the Monetary Policy Transmission in Turkey
Economists and central bankers have been interested in studying the consequences of
house price changes for several reasons. First, as we described in the first chapter, hous-
ing wealth is inherently connected with consumption which could affect price levels and
output. In the light of the recent global developments in the housing market, including
the large gains and subsequent fall in housing prices, it becomes vitally important for
monetary authorities to understand the relationship between housing wealth and con-
sumption. Second, house prices drive the cycles in residential investment, which have
been a useful leading indicator of the general business cycle10 and have been a substantial
component of investment.11 Finally, because house prices and residential investment have
apparently been sensitive to changes in interest rates, the housing market is considered an
important channel through which monetary policy can influence economic activity.
There are various studies that examine the role of housing wealth in the monetary
transmission mechanism (MTM), especially for advanced countries, and most, but not all
of these studies indicate that the housing market plays a critical role in MTM through
consumption and/or residential investment.12 However, there has been no study that
10. R. E. Hall and J. B. Taylor, Macroeconomics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company), 1986, p. 203.
11. In the case of Turkey, private sector’s construction expenditure was nearly 6 percent of real GDP and
26 percent of gross fixed capital formation in 2010.
12. Some of the studies are Aoki et al. (2004), Mishkin (2007), Elbourne (2008), Neri and Stracca (2010),
Milcheva and Sebastian (2010).
investigates the role of house prices in MTM for Turkey. This is surprising because,
based on our findings in the previous chapter and in some other studies in the literature,
housing wealth considerably affects consumer spending in Turkey. This is also important
in the case of Turkey since housing wealth claims the biggest share in total wealth and this
wealth has increased rapidly over recent years.13
In this respect, this chapter provides some quantitative evidence in the Turkish con-
text regarding the effect of monetary shocks on house prices as well as the effect of
house prices on consumption and residential investment in order to assess the role of
house prices in MTM for the period of 1991Q1-2011Q1. Three main questions that this
chapter aims to address are: (i) How does monetary policy affect the housing market in
Turkey? (ii) How do changes in house prices influence consumer spending and residen-
tial investment? (iii) What are the implications of house price developments in Turkey
for the transmission mechanism of the monetary policy? In other words, what propor-
tion of the monetary policy shock transmits to consumption and residential investment
through housing prices? These are all crucial questions for the monetary policy-maker
for determining how to respond to house price shocks when considering how its policy
rate would impact house prices.
In order to answer these questions, we employ a kind of counterfactual experiment.
This experiment has two steps: First, as a benchmark, we estimate a VECMmodel. This
baseline model can be used to construct standard impulse response functions showing the
dynamic response of the variables to an interest rate shock. Such a response gives the total
effect of an interest rate shock on other variables, including the effect via the possible
influence of that shock on the relevant variable (in our experiment, it is house prices).
The second step in the experiment is to simulate the consequences of an interest rate
shock under a counterfactual regimen, following the methodology in Bernanke, Gertler,
and Watson (1997) and Sims and Zha (2006). In this regimen, after a shock, the actual
13. Real house prices rose by 110% through the 1991-2011 period.
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response of the relevant variable is excluded and this variable is set at the baseline level
that is implied by the benchmark VAR estimate. In other words, we assume that the
response of the relevant variable has kept its value in the absence of the exogenous shock.
The difference between the effect of the exogenous shock on the system variables and the
estimated effect when the relevant variable response is excluded can then be interpreted
as a measure of the contribution of the excluded variable’s response. In order to find
these dynamics and responses, we use the VECM with changing cointegration vectors
framework described in Andrade et al. (2005), since there is a structural change in the
Turkish economy in 2001Q1.
According to the results of our VECM, interest rate affects the housing market con-
siderably during both periods. While an increase in interest rate results in increases in
house prices before 2001, it shows an opposite effect after 2001, resulting in decreases in
house prices. In both periods, generally, residential investment presents a fall after an
increase in interest rates for both periods. In addition to that, house prices do play a
considerable role in monetary transmission mechanism after 2001. Our counterfactual
simulation suggests that before 2001, following a contractionary interest rate shock, the
increase in house prices is responsible for almost all decreases seen in consumption and
residential investment in the medium term (2 year period). After 2001, a decrease in
house price in response to a contractionary interest rate shock has long-term effects ac-
counting for 33 percent of the fall in consumption and 75 percent of the fall in residential
construction at the end of the fifth year.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 1 discusses the housing
wealth-MTM linkage. Section 2 reviews previous studies. Section 3 briefly explains the
model. Section 4 reviews the estimation framework. Section 5 presents the data and their
properties. Section 6 provides the empirical analysis. Section 7 presents results. Lastly,
Section 8 concludes.
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3.1 MTM and the Role of Housing Prices in the Economy
The monetary transmission mechanism is a complex topic since there are various chan-
nels through which monetary policy operates. Figure B.5 provides a diagrammatic rep-
resentation of the main types of monetary transmission mechanisms mentioned in the
literature.14
As shown in Figure B.5, the MTM process begins with the transmission of policy
interest rates to consumption and investment (or final targeted variables output and in-
flation), mainly through the market interest rates, exchange rates and expectations. From
there, transmission may proceed through any of the following channels.
The interest rate channel is the primary and direct channel for central banks to affect
the economy. Changes in policy interest rates lead nominal market interest rates, expec-
tations and exchange rates to change. Given some degree of price stickiness, movements
in nominal market interest rate result in changes in real interest rate, which is the user
cost of capital. The changes in the user cost of capital in turn lead to movements in con-
sumption, investment spending, including residential investment,15 and asset prices such
as housing prices. Finally, these movements result in changes in aggregate demand and
prices.
Another important channel in MTM is the housing price channel through which
central banks affect the economy indirectly.16 In order to understand the housing price
channel, first it is better to look at how the monetary policy affects housing prices, and
then examine the impact of housing prices on residential investment and consumption.
14. Some examples of main MTM channels can be reviewed in the papers of the "Monetary Transmission
Mechanism" symposium of fall 1995.
15. Randall (1990), Ryding (1990) and McCarthy and Peach (2002) examined the relationship between
interest rates and residential investment and showed that residential investment responds considerably
to monetary policy in the U.S.
16. Meltzer (1995), discussing the Japanese economic experience in the 1980s and 1990s, is one of the
first/leading studies that mention the housing price channel. Meltzer (1995) suggested that in that
period, the Japanese monetary policy had an important impact on the economy through its effect on
land and property values.
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As seen in Figure B.5, policy interest rate affects housing prices through both the de-
mand and supply sides. From the demand side perspective, monetary policy is transmit-
ted on to the user cost of housing, which is defined as the opportunity cost of purchasing
a house rather than renting it. When monetary policy raises the interest rates, the aver-
age mortgage rate also experiences a rise, and that leads to a higher user cost of capital
for housing. Hence, there will be a fall in demand for housing, which in turn would lead
to a decline in housing construction and prices.17 From the supply side of housing, any
change in interest rates may have an impact on housing construction costs, and thereby
the residential investment.18
This briefly-reviewed linkage between house prices and interest rates, the housing
price impact on residential investment and consumption needs to be examined as a next
step. As seen in Figure B.5, house prices play a role in the monetary transmission mecha-
nism by affecting the residential investment via the Tobin q channel and the consumption
via the wealth and credit channel.19 Here, the Tobin q channel implies that investment
in housing increases when house prices rise. In other words, increased house prices af-
ter a fall in interest rates lead to an increase in the market value of houses relative to
their replacement costs, with a resulting increase in “q”. As a result, investing in housing
becomes more profitable leading to an increase in spending on residential investment.
The wealth and credit channel is another important channel in which house prices
17. From the portfolio view, housing wealth, as one of the main assets, is affected by the price changes of
other assets and also their returns such as bonds. If there occurs an increase in the return of bonds,
households would arrange their portfolio accordingly and they would demand less housing.
18. The interest rate affects both housing demand and supply in the same direction: an increase in interest
rates reduces both the demand and supply of housing. Hence, the effect on housing prices is ambigu-
ous: it depends on the elasticity of the housing demand and supply. Generally, the short term elasticity
of the housing demand is greater than that of the housing supply. Prices would decrease in the short
term in response to an increase in the interest rate. In other words, in the short run, the supply of
housing is not elastic due to the nature of residential investment which is determined by a q-type of
investment function with a convex adjustment cost. It takes a while to construct new houses; thus, a
shock that increases the demand of housing causes house prices to move up. In the long run, Tobin’s q
plays an important role and stimulates the residential investment and also determines the prices.
19. The role the housing sector in economy has been well documented in the literature (Meltzer, 1995;
Mishkin, 1996, 2007).
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are in effect the transmission mechanism. Wealth effect comes from the standard life-
cycle model, developed by Modigliani and Ando (1960) and Ando and Modigliani (1963).
According to the life-cycle model, the level of household consumption is a function of the
lifetime resources of consumers, which are made up of permanent income and physical
wealth that include housing. When house prices fall, the value of housing wealth, thus,
the lifetime resources of consumers decrease, and as a result, consumption should fall.
In addition to the wealth channel, there is also the credit channel through which house
prices affect consumption. According to this view, housing serves as collateral to lower
borrowing cost, which can stimulate consumer spending. When there is a rise in house
prices, it would increase the value of the collateral. This will potentially lead to more
borrowing to finance extra consumption using the appreciated asset as collateral. In other
words, an increase in house prices may lead to higher consumption by increasing the
borrowing capacity of previously credit-constrained households.
Last but not least, the exchange rate channel is an important element in open-
economy macroeconomic models. After a change in interest rates, exchange rates also
move via the uncovered interest rate parity condition. Thus, an increase in the policy
interest rate, relative to foreign rates, would lead to an increase in domestic currency and
this would result in a reduction in net exports, thus affecting the overall level of aggregate
demand and prices.
3.2 Review of the Empirical Studies
Asmentioned above, in order to suggest that house prices play a substantial role inMTM,
two conditions are necessary. First is the existence of a linkage between house prices
and interest rates. Second is the existence of a housing price effect on consumption and
residential investment.20
There has been a vast literature on modeling the housing market in order to quantify
20. In the second chapter, we concentrate on the housing wealth / consumption linkage and attempt to
find the magnitude of this linkage in the long-run.
44
its importance in the economy. However, these studies usually focus on either the first or
the second linkage: the linkage of housing prices with interest rates or with consumption
and residential investment. Not many of them attempt to incorporate housing prices’
role in MTM, and they examine almost entirely the advanced economies. Despite these
limitations in the relevant literature, selected studies can be reviewed according to this
categorization.
3.2.1 Housing Prices-Interest Rate Linkage
There are various academic studies suggesting that interest rates affect the house prices.
Iacoviello (2000) attempts to identify the main factors behind the fluctuations in house
prices in six European countries employing SVAR.21 He uses quarterly GDP, house
prices, money, inflation, and interest rate variables in his estimation and aims to un-
derstand how these variables react to shocks in supply, monetary policy, inflation and
demand. He shows that monetary shocks and demand shocks play important roles on
house price fluctuations over the short run, suggesting a significant negative impact of
monetary shocks on real house prices. Parallel to this finding, in a more recent study, Ia-
coviello and Minetti (2008) employ different VAR specifications for four European coun-
tries.22 Their findings suggest that house prices significantly decline following an increase
in the short term interest rate.
Aoki et al. (2002) also show that the house market in the UK is affected by the mon-
etary policy. Using VAR by including output, inflation, oil prices, broad money, short
term interest rate, consumption, housing prices and housing investment, this study sug-
gests that a decrease in the interest rate leads to an increase in house prices.
Besides the studies examining the European countries, there are also some studies for
the U.S. economy. One of the most recent studies, Jarocinski and Smets (2008) estimates
21. The countries he examined are France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK.
22. The countries examined are Finland, Germany, Norway and the UK.
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BVAR for theU.S. housing market. Using a nine-variable estimation that includes the real
GDP, GDP deflator, commodity prices, the federal funds rate, M2, real consumption,
real housing investment, real house prices, and the long-term interest rate spread, the
monetary policy is found to have significant effects on house prices.
In all these selected studies, it is suggested that there is a significant relationship be-
tween interest rates and house prices.
3.2.2 Housing Prices-Consumption and Residential Investment Linkage
There have been numerous studies that examine the effect of the house prices on con-
sumption which we mentioned in the previous chapter. Most of these studies, although
not incorporating the housing price-interest rate linkage, indicate that rising house prices
stimulate consumers to spend more than they would without such price increases.23
However, the empirical literature is inconclusive about the estimates of the marginal
propensity to consume out of housing wealth. These estimates vary substantially across
studies due to the use of different types of consumption and wealth data and/or differ-
ent estimation techniques to test the wealth effects. The differences also stem from the
unstable nature of wealth effects over time.
When it comes to the house prices-residential investment relationship, many papers
suggest that housing construction is affected by house prices; thus, Tobin q is a valid
argument for residential investment. Since these selected studies do not analyze the Tobin
q effect in residential investment by itself and they also include the analysis of the house
prices’ role in MTM, they are reviewed in the next section among with the literature on
house prices and MTM.24
23. Some of the leading studies are Case et al. (2005), Ludwig and Slok (2004), Girouard and Blondal
(2001), Carroll et al. (2004).
24. These papers are Mishkin (2007), Musso, Neri and Stracca (2010) and Jarocinski and Smets (2008)
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3.2.3 House Prices and MTM
Asmentioned above, most of the housing market literature focuses on a particular part of
the transmission mechanism. However, there are also studies that attempt to incorporate
the housing market’s role in MTM in a more general framework.
One of the important studies is the paper by Aoki et al. (2004) that analyzes the
transmission of the monetary policy in a general dynamic equilibrium framework. Fol-
lowing Bernanke and Blinder (1988), Aoki et al (2004) considers a general equilibrium
model with frictions in the credit markets used by households and shows that housing
plays an important role in MTM. In the model by Aoki et al. (2004), housing serves as
collateral to lower the borrowing cost. They calibrate their DSGE model and suggest
that using housing as collateral amplifies the effect of monetary policy shocks on house
prices, residential investment, and consumption.
In another important study, Mishkin (2007) uses the FRB/US model to find the role
that housing plays in the monetary transmission mechanism. The model used in this
study does incorporate the direct interest rate effect on housing activity through the user
cost of capital and the indirect effect through wealth effects from house prices. To il-
lustrate the importance of housing in the transmission mechanism, he first attempts to
find how the model responds to a monetary policy shock, and then he isolates the re-
sponses generated when the interest rate effect on housing and the housing wealth effects
are excluded. He shows that excluding these channels reduces the peak GDP response
by about 14 percent of the total response, which indicates that the house prices play a
moderate role in the transmission mechanism. Mishkin (2007) also shows that residen-
tial investment is affected by house prices. A 20 percent decline in house prices (evenly
corresponding to the decline in house prices over the two-year period from 2007 to 2008)
leads to a reduction in residential investment of up to 6 percent.
Elbourne (2008) adopts a structural VARmodel to understand the effect of monetary
policy changes on consumption behavior. He uses consumption, commodity prices, the
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Federal Funds rate, house prices, money, inflation and interest rate variables in the es-
timation. Using a two-step approach and a counterfactual simulation, Elbourne (2008)
suggests that about 12-15 percent of the drop in consumption responding to a contrac-
tionary monetary policy shock is coming through the changes in house prices.
As a multi-country study, Musso, Neri and Stracca (2010) examine the role of the
housing market in the economy in the U.S. and in the Euro area. Using the variables of
consumption, residential investment, CPI, the real house price, mortgage lending rate,
interest rate and mortgage debt in the SVAR model, they find that housing plays an
important role in MTM in both the Euro area and the U.S., with a stronger role in the
U.S. Parallel toMishkin (2007), they also suggest that an increase in house prices leads to a
rise in housing construction, indicating the linkage between house prices and residential
investment.
In an another multi-country study, Milcheva and Sebastian (2010) estimate a VAR
model for 14 European countries, 7 Central and Eastern countries and the U.S. to clarify
the role of the housing market in MTM. The variables they use in the estimation include
the consumer price index, consumption expenditures, fixed capital formation in hous-
ing, house prices and interest rates. They suggest pronounced housing wealth effects in
countries that they examined.
On the other hand, there are studies suggesting that the housing market does not play
a strong role in MTM. Ludvingson et al. (2002) review the role of household wealth in
MTM for the U.S. Estimating a small VAR, they find that both stock wealth and non-
stock wealth, which is the proxy of housing wealth, have minor roles in MTM. In a
more recent study, Jarocinski and Smets (2008) review the role of the housing market
and monetary policy in U.S. business cycles. Although they find that monetary policy
has significant effects on housing investment and house prices as we explained above,
house prices do not play an important role in MTM according to their findings. Parallel
to Mishkin (2007) and Musso, Neri and Stracca (2010), Jarocinski and Smets (2008) also
suggest that house prices affect residential investment. According to their study, house
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prices explain a large fraction of the changes in residential investment between 2001Q1-
2007Q2 (except 2004) implying that Tobin q is in effect in those years.
3.3 Model
In order to analyze the role of housing prices in the monetary policy transmission mech-
anism, we first require a model. With a view distinct from that of the wealth channel,
the role of monetary policy in affecting overall economic activity, which is based on
the credit channel, can be modeled similar to a financial accelerator mechanism. In that
model, interest rates affect housing prices and this price change possibly amplifies the
effect of interest rates on the economy. The model of this kind of a credit channel of
housing wealth is developed by Aoki et al. (2004). Applying the financial accelerator
model of Bernanke and Blinder (1988), Aoki et al. (2004) considers a general equilibrium
model with imperfections in credit markets resulting in significant monitoring costs for
lenders. Lenders, therefore, charge a premium over the risk-free interest rate to borrow-
ers. Thus, borrowers’ net worth affects the probability of default which in turn changes
the external finance premium. As a result, using housing as collateral lowers the borrow-
ing cost. Based on this relationship, Aoki et al. (2004) show that the collateral channel
amplifies the effect of monetary policy shocks on consumption and residential invest-
ment. As we show using the schematic representation of this type of model in Figure
B.5, the equations and the explicit form of the model are not included here.
3.4 Estimation Methodology
A VAR is a convenient device for examining the short run dynamics of an economy and
for computing the dynamic response of the variables to the fundamental shocks. We can
write the structural VAR in the following way;
AYt = B(L)Yt−1+C (L)Xt + et , (3.1)
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where Yt is the vector of endogenous variables, Xt is the vector of exogenous vari-
ables and et is the vector of structural shocks with ei t ∼ (0,σ
2
ei t
) and Σet e ′t
= I . By pre-
multiplying A−1 by both sides of structural VAR, the reduced formVAR can be expressed
by;
Yt =Φ(L)Yt−1+Ω(L)Xt + ut , (3.2)
where Φ(L)=A−1*B(L), Ω(L)=A−1*C (L) and ut = A
−1 ∗ et with Σut u ′t = V . As it is
seen like structural shocks, "et "s, "ut "s are also an unobservable i.i.d. zero mean white
noises. On the other hand, although "ut "s are serially uncorrelated, unlike the "et"s,
they are correlated across equations. However, consistent estimates of Φs and Ωs can be
obtained by OLS and also variance-covariance matrix V can be estimated from the fitted
residuals if the variables are stationary. If the variables are not stationary, it is better to
search for the overall stationarity of the system; in other words, we have to look at the
cointegration properties of the variables first.
Even after estimating the VAR as in Equation (3.2) consistently, it is not possible to
compute the dynamic response of Yt to a particular economic shock. This is because
there is no reason to assume that any element of ut corresponds to a particular economic
shock et . Among various ways to identify the structural model, we use Choleski decom-
position as suggested by Sims (1980) to identify the shocks by imposing lower triangular
structure on matrix A.
3.5 Data and Their Properties
3.5.1 Data
We use 6 variables to model the dynamics of MTM. Bearing in mind the potential risk of
omitting important information by using small model, we try to save degrees of freedom
since our sample size is not large. The variables that are included can be seen in Figure
B.6 and are; log of real consumption (CON), log of residential investment (RIV), log of
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Consumer Price index (CPI), policy interest rate (INT), log of exchange rates (EXC) and
log of Real House Price Index (RHP). Like the data set we use in the previous chapter,
our data set here is a quarterly series and covers the period from 1991Q1 to 2011Q1.
Detailed description of the data is given in Appendix C. Since CON and CPI series show
seasonal patterns, we filter both series by Census X12.
In order to take into consideration the crises of 1994, 1998, 2001, and the U.S. mort-
gage crisis in 2007, we introduce 7 impulse dummies for 1994Q1, 1994Q2, 1998Q3,
2000Q4, 2001Q1, 2001Q2 and 2007Q3.
As it is seen from Table A.17, the ADF test shows that none of the variables are
stationary in levels, whereas all variables are stationary in their first differences.25 We
also conduct a modified ADF test proposed by Lanne et al. (2002) to account for the
structural break in data. As is seen from the Table A.17, the modified ADF test also shows
that none of the variables are stationary in levels, which is parallel to the standard ADF
test results, whereas all variables are stationary in their first differences. In conclusion,
the evidence of unit root in our variables is found to be strong.
Since all our variables are well represented by I(1) processes, the next step is to in-
vestigate the cointegration properties of these data to see whether there exists a long-run
relationship within the system. If a cointegration vector is detected, it is more efficient
to estimate our VAR in a VECM framework that takes this long-run relationship into
consideration.
3.5.2 Testing for Cointegration
In cointegration testing,first it is necessary to determine the appropriate lag. To deter-
mine the appropriate lag structure (p), we write the unstructured VAR(p) of our model
in levels that includes the break (represented by shift and slope dummies) and the trend
since CPI is trend stationary in its first difference, and we choose the value for "p" which
25. Since CPI shows quadratic trend, it is trend stationary in its first difference.
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minimizes the information criteria and that can pass from the diagnostic tests. Fitting
5th or higher order lag implies that too many degrees of freedom are lost; thus, we use
4th order as the maximum lag length in the analysis. The SC (Schwarz Criterion), HQ
(Hannan-Quinn information criterion) and AIC (Akaike’s information criterion) suggest
1, 4 and 4 lags in levels respectively. Values for the information criteria are reported in
Table A.18. We base our final choice of the lag length on the criterion which gives us the
absence of serial correlation in the residuals. As a result, we use the HQ and AIC and
select the lag length as 4.
Having determined the appropriate lag length, the next step requires testing for coin-
tegration among the endogenous variables. Parallel to Chapter II, the cointegration prop-
erties of the I(1) variables are investigated by a series of tests. They are Saikkonen and
Lutkepohl test (Saikkonen and Lutkepohl, 2000), which is robust to structural break in
the cointegration vector, and Johansen Trace tests (Johansen, 1991 and Johansen et al.,
2000).26 As we mentioned before, it is shown by Andrade et al. (2005) that Johansen
Trace test performs well under the structural break. Table A.19 displays the results of the
tests.
According to the results of both tests, there are three cointegration vectors between
the variables at the 5% significance level.
3.6 Estimation
As we did in the previous chapter, we choose to implement the Andrade et al. (2005)
method that accounts for the break in 2001. The estimated cointegration vectors for the
26. We did two kind of Trace tests which are developed by Johansen (1991, 2000). One of them is a classic
Trace test (Johansen, 1991) that does not consider any structural break. The second one, explained
in Johansen (2000), is the modified Trace test that includes the structural break concept referring to
a level shift in the cointegration vector. Since the critical values of the Johansen test (1991) do not
include exogenous variables, except the trend and the constant, we should simulate the new critical
values for the cointegration test that accounts for a structural break. In our analysis, the critical values
as well as the p-values of all Johansen trace tests are obtained by computing the respective response
surface according to Johansen et al. (2000) by using JMulti.
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periods 1991Q1-2001Q1 and 2001Q2-2011Q1 based on the Andrade et al. (2005) method
can be seen in Table A.20.27
Since we are searching for the short run dynamics of the system in order to get re-
sponse functions, we do not need to identify the coefficients of the long-run relationship
between the variables. Thus, we do not normalize the cointegration vectors.28
For our results to be econometrically valid, our model should satisfy certain condi-
tions in terms of residuals and coefficients. We conducted the diagnostic tests for the
VECM, and the results can be seen from Table A.21. According to these test results, the
residuals of VECM estimations satisfy the conditions of normality, autocorrelation and
heteroscedasticity in all equations.
3.6.1 Identification of the Structural Shocks
As wementioned above, in order to identify structural shocks, we apply the recursiveness
assumption by imposing a lower triangular structure on matrix A. In our benchmark
specification, the endogenous vector is ordered as Yt={ real consumption, residential
investment, real house price, price level, exchange rate, interest rate}.29
We have three main blocks in our ordering; macroeconomic variables, prices and
policy rate. In our identification scheme, we assume that macroeconomic variables are
slow-moving variables that are not contemporaneously affected from the other variables.
Thus, we write investment and consumption variables as the first two variables in our
ordering. Having consumption in the first column of the ordering can be justified with
the permanent-income type of behavior. According to this type of behavior, the log of
consumption is close to a random walk. In other words, consumption growth cannot be
27. We just display the general case results where both loading coefficients and the cointegration vector
changes.
28. Normalizing the cointegration vector requires the theoretically ordering of the variables in the cointe-
gration vector.
29. Actually, the order of these elements does not change our results. We show this in the robustness
section below.
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predicted, meaning that consumption is not contemporaneously affected from the other
variables.30 In the identification scheme, we write the prices after the macroeconomic
variables. This ordering implies that after consumption and investment decisions are
taken, it is the price that clears the market. It is also important to note that ordering
the house price after consumption is also a valid argument. Since housing is an asset,
it is normal to assume that housing wealth, like other wealth components, is taken as a
given variable at the beginning of the period by the consumers. Hence, it can be assumed
that consumption is not influenced contemporaneously by house prices. At the end of
our ordering, we write the policy rate. We can see that this way of ordering implies
that monetary authority is assumed to observe other endogenous variables; as a result,
the level of policy rate is affected by other variables in the same quarter. Some may
argue that house price is an asset price which can react almost instantaneously to the
news or interest rate. However, it is worth noting that the opposite also seems plausible:
monetary policy is likely to respond within a quarter to movements in asset values. In
the benchmark scheme, we follow the second argument. We also impose an ordering that
takes the first argument into consideration where house prices contemporaneously react
to interest rates in the robustness section.
3.6.2 Impulse Responses and Counterfactual Experiment
Since we have different cointegration vectors for each period, we should estimate each pe-
riod’s impulse responses separately.31 In order to do that, we use the cointegration vector
of the period that we are going to estimate the impulse responses for.32 We calculate the
current period’s impulse responses using only the pre-estimated cointegration vectors of
30. Consumption growth is not, of course, exactly a randomwalk if the households are credit-constrained.
Thus, there is predictable component in consumption growth which means that consumption is con-
temporaneously affected by other variables such as prices and interest rates.
31. As we display in Table A.20, we have three cointegration vectors for each period.
32. It is important to note that, as we already showed in Chapter 2, with the estimation framework that we
use following Andreda et al. (2005), we assumed that the short run parameters are constant between
periods whereas only the cointegration vector (and its loading coefficients) change between periods.
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that period, their loading coefficients and the other short-run variable coefficients within
the structure that is shown in Equation (3.2).
Since we aim to estimate the contribution of the house prices to the changes in con-
sumption and residential investment, following Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (1997)
and Sims and Zha (2006), we tighten the focus of our investigation by adopting a “shut
down” approach. In this approach, after a shock, the response of the relevant variable is
shut down and set at the baseline level that is implied by the VAR estimates. In other
words, the response of the relevant variable is kept at its initial value in the absence of
the exogenous shock and the impulse responses of the other variables are recalculated.
The difference between the effect of the exogenous shock on the system variables and the
estimated effect when the relevant variable response is shut down can then be interpreted
as a measure of the contribution of the excluded variable’s response.33
In our study, since we examine the transmission of monetary policy into residential
investment and consumption via the monetary policy’s influence on house prices, the
counter factual experiment that we describe above is conducted as follows: First, as a
baseline, we estimate a model that includes all six variables that we mentioned before.
Using this six-variable system as a benchmark, we construct standard impulse response
functions (IRFs) showing the dynamic responses of residential investment and consump-
tion to an interest rate shock. Such responses give the total effect of the interest rate shock
on residential investment and consumption, including the effect via the influence of that
shock on real house prices.
In the second step, we simulate the consequences of an interest rate shock under a
counterfactual experiment where we exclude the house price channel by setting the coef-
33. This kind of experiment, where most equations are held fixed while some are changed, is obviously
subject to the Lucas Critique since we are ignoring the fact that agents modify their expectations and
behave differently under new conditions. In order to accommodate the Lucas Critique, Sims and
Zha (1995) argue that since the agents are conditioned by past experiences and reluctant to initiate
an arduous learning process, it takes some time for agents to learn that the apparently permanent
condition may be quite otherwise. The Lucas Critique may not be a major concern in the experiment
that is conducted in this section, especially for short run analysis.
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ficients of the other variables in the house price equation zero. In other words, we keep
their values in the absence of an exogenous shock and the impulse responses of the other
variables are simulated under this restriction. The difference between the estimated ef-
fect of an interest rate shock on consumption and residential investment in the baseline
model and that in the counterfactual experiment is then can be interpreted as a measure
of the contribution of the house prices channel in MTM.
3.7 Results
3.7.1 Results of Benchmark Model
Figures B.7, B.8 and B.9 show the effect of a contractionary monetary policy shock for
the two periods, pre-2001 and post-2001. As it is seen from Figure B.9, the responses to
an interest rate shock differ between both periods. For more solid understanding, it is
better to analyze the pre-2001 and post-2001 periods separately.
Figure B.7 shows the effect of a one point increase in interest rate as a contractionary
monetary policy shock for the pre-2001 period. As is expected, we find that consumption
and the exchange rate fall after an interest rate shock. On the other hand, consumer
prices and house prices tend to increase for the same period, which shows that there
are consumer price and house price puzzles present before 2001. These contradictions
may be explained by the existing cost channel of the monetary policy before 2001. For
the house price puzzle, the demand of housing before 2001 does not rely on interest
rates due to the unavailability of mortgage credits whereas the supply of housing is still
affected by interest rates through the cost of capital channel. For the consumer price
puzzle, the upward movement may be explained by the fragile debt structure before 2001.
Since the interest payment in government debt is very high during that time period (13
percent of GDP on average), a rise in interest rates increases the debt burden resulting
in a higher monetization which in turn leads to a persistent high inflation process that is
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typical in the pre-crisis period.34 When the residential investment is examined, it shows
a slight increase after an interest shock for the first three quarters, and then, it begins to
decrease until the 10th quarter. The unexpected increase in the first three quarters may be
explained by the fact that expectations about increasing house prices stimulate residential
investment and offset the negative cost effect of an interest shock. After the third quarter,
the residential investment begins to decrease.
When the post-2001 period is examined, we can see that, contrary to the pre-2001
period, puzzles in the prices are gone, and the house prices and consumer prices (although
these are statistically insignificant) decrease after an increase in interest rates. (Figure B.8)
In addition to that, in contrast to the pre-2001 period, residential investment shows a
fall and the consumption becomes more responsive. Consumption decreases further for
a longer period after a contractionary interest shock during this period. On the other
hand, in contrast to the pre-2001 period, the exchange rate puzzle is present after 2001.
This may be explained by the rapid decrease in the risk premium of the country after the
crisis. A decrease in the risk premium may drive both exchange rates and interest rates
down for this period. Since our model does not include the risk premium variable, it is
not surprising to see exchange rate puzzle in our results.35
Before analyzing the role of house prices in the transmission mechanism, it is impor-
tant to check the effect of a real house price shock on the other variables. Figures B.10
and B.11 show the responses to a real house price shock for the two periods separately. It
is important to note here that in both periods a rise in house prices results in a statistically
significant increase in both consumer prices and interest rates in a one year time. After
one year, this effect becomes statistically insignificant. Before 2001, both consumption
and residential investment fall after an increase in house prices. These falls can be ex-
plained by the inflationary pressure of the house prices. In other words, as we mentioned
34. The average annual inflation between 1991 and 2001 is 55 percent that implies a high monetization.
35. An 80% decrease in EMBI spread has been seen after 2001.
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above, increases in house prices cause consumer prices and interest rates to rise. These
increases in prices and interest rates dominate the expansionary effect of house prices on
residential investment and consumption. Thus, residential investment and consumption
present decreases after an increase in house prices. The fall in the consumption can also be
partially explained by the absence of the collateral effect of housing wealth before 2001.
As we mentioned in Chapter 2, consumer credits have very low shares in banking credits
and housing is generally not used as collateral before 2007. Considering these, the only
link through which house prices affects consumption is the wealth channel.
Contrary to pre-2001, after 2001, consumption increases after an increase in house
prices in the first two quarters. After that, consumption begins to decrease; however,
this fall is statistically insignificant. On the other hand, unlike the decrease during pre-
2001, residential investment becomes unresponsive to house price shock after 2001. The
limited increase in consumption and unresponsiveness of residential investment in post-
2001 again can be explained by the rising consumer prices and interest rates as a result of
the increase in house prices.
3.7.2 Counterfactual Experiment
In order to understand the role of house prices in the transmission mechanism more
clearly, we do a counterfactual experiment by excluding the house price response from
the system. Thus, the role house prices play in the transmission mechanism can be un-
derstood from the comparison of the previous main impulse responses with the new
simulated ones.
As seen in Figure B.12, for the pre-crisis period, housing prices have a statistically
significant effect on residential investment and consumption in the medium term (nearly
in the first two years). In other words, when we exclude the house price increase in
response to a contractionary interest rate shock from the system, consumption and resi-
dential investment decrease less. At the end of the second year, the house price increase
is responsible for almost all decreases seen in consumption and residential investment.
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On the other hand, since the interest rate shock has no statistically significant effect on
residential investment and consumption, we can not say anything about the house price
effects on these variables’ responses to an interest rate shock.
As for the post-crisis period, housing prices have statistically significant effects on
residential investment and consumption in the long term. (Figure B.13) At the end of the
fifth year, the peak responses of residential investment and consumption to an interest
rate shock change from -0.9 to -0.2 and -0.22 to -0.15 respectively when the housing price
effect is eliminated. Thus, it can be inferred that once the house price response is excluded
from the system, after a positive interest rate shock, 0.07 percentage points (about 33
percent) of the fall in consumption and 0.7 percentage points (about 75 percent) of the
fall in residential investment are due to the decrease in house prices in the long term.
3.7.3 Robustness
There are other possible orderings that we can identify the structural shocks with. In
order to check our results’ robustness to the identification of the shocks, we did a variety
of alternative orderings. Since we got similar results, to save space, we are going to present
only two of them here.
Our benchmark model that we present above implies that monetary authority ob-
serves other endogenous variables; and thus, the level of policy rate is affected by other
variables in the same quarter. On the other hand, this presumption also implies that all
variables react to an innovation in the interest rates with a lag. This assumption may
be reasonable for “sluggish” macroeconomic variables and some prices, but it is clearly
less plausible for asset prices like house prices, which can react almost instantaneously to
news about monetary policy. We take this argument into consideration and we impose
an ordering that reflects this argument. In this alternative specification, the endogenous
vector is ordered as Yt={ real consumption, residential investment, price level, exchange
rate, interest rate, real house price }
As we remember from the benchmark ordering, we assume that consumption is not
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contemporaneously affected by the other variables. Another alternative ordering can be
made for another argument that consumers are credit-constrained; thus, consumption
may be affected by the other variables contemporaneously. This kind of assumption
also contains the argument that housing has a collateral value; thus, house price affects
consumption contemporaneously. Following these arguments, we do an alternative spec-
ification and we order the endogenous vector as Yt={residential investment, real house
price, price level, exchange rate, real consumption, interest rate }
For each alternative specification, Figures B.7, B.8, B.14 and B.15 report the effects of
a 1 point interest rate shock under the standard VECM estimation allowing house price
effects on other variables in the model. Figures B.12, B.13, B.16 and B.17 present the
counterfactual experiment results for these two specifications in which the house price
channel is shut off by fixing the house price at its baseline value.
Overall, both specifications give similar estimated impulse response functions. For
both specifications, the counterfactual experiment shows that house prices play an im-
portant role in determining residential investment and consumption. Shutting off the
house price response tends to reduce the negative effect of the interest rate shock on res-
idential investment and consumption in both orderings, by magnitudes that are similar
across specifications.
3.8 Conclusion
This chapter aimed to provide some quantitative evidence on the role of house prices in
MTM for Turkey, which was not previously investigated. In this respect, we employed
a 6 variable VECM model of the effect of monetary shocks on house prices and the ef-
fect of house prices on consumption and residential investment in order to assess the role
of house prices in MTM for the period 1991Q1-2011Q1. The main question that the
chapter aimed to address is what proportion of the monetary policy shock transmits to
consumption and residential investment through housing prices. This is a crucial ques-
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tion for the monetary policy maker who needs to understand how to respond to house
price shocks and how their policy rate impacts house prices.
The impulse responses of our model indicate that the interest rate affects the housing
market considerably during both periods. While increases in interest rate results in in-
creases in house prices before 2001, it shows an opposite effect after 2001, which results in
decreases in house prices. As for residential investment, it generally presents a fall after an
increase in interest rates for both periods. In addition, we found that house prices do play
a considerable role in consumption and residential investment in only the medium term
(2 year period) before 2001 whereas they play a crucial role in only the long term (five
year period) after 2001. Our study suggests that before 2001, following a contractionary
interest rate shock, the increase in house prices is responsible for almost all decreases seen
in consumption and residential investment in the medium term. During this period, a
house price change has no long-term effects on consumption and residential investment.
After 2001, in response to a contractionary interest rate shock, a decrease in house price
has long-term effects accounting for 33 percent of the fall in consumption and 75 percent
of the fall in residential construction. Thus, we conclude that house price is an important
factor that determines consumption and residential investment in Turkey.
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Chapter 4
Conclusion
Analyzing the role of housing wealth on economic activity is of fundamental importance
to monetary authority if its goal is to achieve price stability and sustainable economic
growth. Given the recently rising house prices and predominance of housing in total
household wealth in Turkey as well as the impact of housing meltdown on macroeco-
nomic stability in some of the world’s leading economies recently, it is vital for the mon-
etary authority to understand the linkage between housing wealth and consumption and
the role of housing in monetary transmission mechanism.
This study first investigated the impact of housing wealth on aggregate consumer
spending in the context of Turkey using a system approach that takes the structural break
into consideration with quarterly data for the 1991Q1–2011Q1 period. Our estimation
is believed to have advantage over the existing studies in the literature which mostly em-
ployed Engle-Granger single equation estimation using poor proxies for housing wealth
and not including the structural break in the Turkish economy in 2001 into their esti-
mations. Another contribution to the existing studies is that we estimated an alternative
econometric model based upon Carroll (2004) in order to improve the robustness to in-
stability in the long-run relationship between the variables. Both models suggested that
permanent changes in housing wealth have considerable effects on aggregate consump-
tion after 2001 whereas financial wealth has no effect on consumption in the same period.
We estimated that a permanent one percent increase in real per-capita housing wealth is
associated with a 0.28 percent increase in real per-capita consumption in the long run.
Since our VECM results indicated that housing wealth does play a role in determining
consumption, the next step was to find out whether there is a linkage between monetary
policy and housing wealth and if so, how this relationship operates. For this purpose,
we estimated a 6 variable VECM model for Turkey on the effect of monetary shocks on
house prices and the effect of house prices on consumption in order to assess the role
of house prices in MTM for the period of 1991Q1-2011Q1. The main question that the
chapter aimed to address is what proportion of the monetary policy shock transmits to
consumption through housing prices. This is a crucial question for the monetary policy
making in order to respond to house price shocks appropriately and to understand how
its policy rate affects house prices. The impulse responses we found indicated that hous-
ing prices do play a considerable role in the consumption and residential investment.
Our study suggested that following a contractionary interest rate shock, the change in
house prices is responsible for almost all decreases seen in consumption and residential
investment in the medium term. After 2001, in response to a contractionary interest rate
shock, a decrease in house price has long-term effects accounting for 33 percent of the
fall in consumption and 75 percent of the fall in residential construction. Thus, we con-
cluded that house prices play an important factor that drives consumption and residential
investment in Turkey.
In the light of the empirical evidence and the recent developments in Turkey’s finan-
cial sector and housing markets, it is crucial for monetary authority to closely monitor
trends in the consumption-wealth link and to craft policies accordingly. With the recent
mortgage law that was enacted in 2007 and the continuing financial deepening, which
provides new financial products, the scope for homeowners in Turkey to borrow against
housing collateral may also increase over time. Under such a scenario, house prices will
tend to rise and the housing wealth may have even larger impacts upon aggregate spend-
ing and the macroeconomy.
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Appendix A 
 
Tables 
 
Table A.1: Annual % Change in Real House Prices for Some Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1995-2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
USA 2.3 5.0 5.2 4.5 7.8 9.6 7.3
Japan -2.6 -3.4 -3.8 -5.2 -6.1 -4.6 -4.4
Germany -1.6 -1.9 -3.3 -2.0 -3.8 -1.9 -2.0
France 2.1 6.0 6.2 9.4 12.6 13.2 10.9
Italy -0.9 5.7 6.8 7.3 7.5 5.2 4.4
UK 8.2 6.8 14.6 14.2 10.4 3.4 2.3
Canada 0.0 2.0 7.7 6.5 7.5 7.6 9.1
Australia 3.5 6.5 15.3 15.0 4.1 -1.1 1.5
Denmark 6.7 3.4 1.3 1.1 7.9 15.6 22.4
Spain 2.6 6.5 12.9 16.4 14.8 10.9 6.9
Finland 7.8 -3.5 8.3 4.5 5.9 5.1 9.8
Ireland 17.6 4.1 5.6 11.4 9.1 9.4 11.7
The Netherlands 11.6 5.6 4.3 2.4 2.9 3.3 3.1
Norway 9.3 3.9 3.6 -0.7 9.6 6.6 8.4
New Zealand 1.7 -0.8 6.6 17.3 9.6 11.1 6.7
Sweeden 6.3 5.1 4.3 4.2 15.2 8.1 11.5
Switzerland -2.5 0.9 4.0 2.3 8.2 -0.1 1.8
Source: Girouard et al. 2006
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Table A.2: Unit Root Tests (Chap. 2) 
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Table A.3: Information Criteria (Chap. 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AIC SC HQ
p=1 -30.997 -29.242 -30.314
p=2 -31.234 -29.121 -30.627
p=3 -31.268 -28.941 -30.061
p=4 -30.867 -25.765 -29.467
p=5 -30.123 -24.765 -28.654
AIC SC HQ
p=1 -29.838 -28.232 -29.197
p=2 -30.065 -27.947 -29.220
p=3 -29.943 -27.308 -28.893
p=4 -30.113 -26.951 -28.855
p=5 -30.023 -26.327 -28.554
#: VAR includes; shift and slope dummies.
VAR(p)
Information Criteria
Lag Order Selection
VAR(p) Information Criteria
Lag Order Selection (includes structural break) #
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Table A.4: Cointegration Test Results (Chap. 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ho:rank=r H1:rank>r LR p-value 90% 95% 99%
r=0 r>0 47.61 0.007 37.04 40.07 46.20
r=1 r>1 20.12 0.154 21.76 24.16 29.11
r=2 r>2 8.02 0.239 10.47 12.26 16.10
r=3 r>3 3.01 0.098 2.98 4.13 6.93
Ho:rank=r H1:rank>r LR p-value 90% 95% 99%
r=0 r>0 75.63 0.000 50.50 53.94 60.81
r=1 r>1 33.31 0.078 32.25 35.07 40.78
r=2 r>2 11.92 0.464 17.98 20.16 24.69
r=3 r>3 4.93 0.301 7.60 9.14 12.53
Ho:rank=r H1:rank>r LR p-value 90% 95% 99%
r=0 r>0 101.56 0.000 55.89 58.12 62.47
r=1 r>1 37.78 0.031 36.92 38.87 42.70
r=2 r>2 18.23 0.329 21.89 23.61 27.07
r=3 r>3 5.63 0.550 11.05 12.85 16.69
1: includes; intercept, 4 lags in level and impulse dummies.
Johansen Trace Test 1
Johansen Trace Test 2
2: includes; intercept, 4 lags in level, shift dummy and other impulse 
dummies. Response surface that gives the critical values are computed via 
Jmulti.
Saikkonen&Lutkepohl 1
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Table A.5: VECM Results for Case 1 
 
Estimated cointegration relations:
con dpi fw hw
ect≤t0 1.00 -0.80 -0.11 -0.04
ect>t0 1.00 -0.30 -0.03 -0.25
∆con(t) ∆dpi(t) ∆fw(t) ∆hw(t)
Loading coefficients
α t -0.07 0.14 0.09 0.22
p-value [ 0.02 ] [ 0.21 ] [ 0.87 ] [ 0.00 ]
Lagged endogenous terms
∆con(t-1) 0.09 0.35 -0.23 -0.48
p-value [ 0.64 ] [ 0.15 ] [ 0.54 ] [ 0.03 ]
∆dpi(t-1) 0.07 -0.27 -0.33 -0.05
p-value [ 0.43 ] [ 0.04 ] [ 0.43 ] [ 0.34 ]
∆fw(t-1) 0.07 0.02 -0.04 0.04
p-value [ 0.01 ] [ 0.76 ] [ 0.23 ] [ 0.65 ]
∆hw(t-1) -0.08 -0.32 0.08 0.06
p-value [ 0.34 ] [ 0.01 ] [ 0.56 ] [ 0.89 ]
Deterministic terms
c 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
p-value [ 0.01 ] [ 0.02 ] [ 0.05 ] [ 0.01 ]
d94Q2 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06
p-value [ 0.01 ] [ 0.64 ] [ 0.12 ] [ 0.00 ]
d98Q3 -0.02 -0.03 -0.16 -0.03
p-value [ 0.67 ] [ 0.64 ] [ 0.01 ] [ -0.32 ]
d99Q4 0.00 -0.03 0.06 -0.05
p-value [ 0.66 ] [ 0.64 ] [ 0.05 ] [ 0.03 ]
d01Q1 -0.03 -0.14 -0.07 -0.04
p-value [ 0.02 ] [ 0.01 ] [ 0.18 ] [ 0.01 ]
d01Q2 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02
p-value [ 0.04 ] [ 0.54 ] [ 0.23 ] [ 0.01 ]
d98Q1 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.02
p-value [ 0.02 ] [ 0.64 ] [ 0.21 ] [ 0.32 ]
Unrestricted VECM for Case 1
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Table A.6: VECM Results for Case 2 
 
Estimated cointegration relations:
con dpi fw hw
ect≤t0 1.00 -0.82 -0.11 -0.02
ect>t0 1.00 -0.27 -0.12 -0.20
∆con(t) ∆dpi(t) ∆fw(t) ∆hw(t)
Loading coefficients
α t≤t0 -0.02 0.13 -0.68 0.13
p-value [ 0.03 ] [ 0.03 ] [ 0.41 ] [ 0.18 ]
α t>t0 -0.10 0.01 0.47 0.21
p-value [ 0.01 ] [ 0.64 ] [ 0.30 ] [ 0.00 ]
Lagged endogenous terms
∆con(t-1) 0.09 0.45 -0.21 -0.48
p-value [ 0.51 ] [ 0.04 ] [ 0.42 ] [ 0.01 ]
∆dpi(t-1) -0.05 -0.36 -0.14 0.04
p-value [ 0.43 ] [ 0.00 ] [ 0.38 ] [ 0.78 ]
∆fw(t-1) 0.07 0.03 -0.09 0.01
p-value [ 0.03 ] [ 0.53 ] [ 0.34 ] [ 0.87 ]
∆hw(t-1) -0.07 -0.38 0.18 0.06
p-value [ 0.35 ] [ 0.01 ] [ 0.23 ] [ 0.46 ]
Deterministic terms
c 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01
p-value [ 0.01 ] [ 0.02 ] [ 0.01 ] [ 0.01 ]
d94Q2 -0.06 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06
p-value [ 0.01 ] [ 0.01 ] [ 0.17 ] [ 0.00 ]
d98Q3 -0.02 -0.03 -0.16 -0.03
p-value [ 0.62 ] [ 0.03 ] [ 0.01 ] [ 0.03 ]
d99Q4 0.01 -0.03 0.06 -0.05
p-value [ 0.54 ] [ 0.64 ] [ 0.02 ] [ 0.03 ]
d01Q1 -0.04 -0.14 -0.07 -0.09
p-value [ 0.00 ] [ 0.01 ] [ 0.08 ] [ 0.00 ]
d01Q2 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05
p-value [ 0.02 ] [ 0.04 ] [ 0.68 ] [ 0.00 ]
d98Q1 0.03 -0.01 0.05 0.03
p-value [ 0.02 ] [ 0.03 ] [ 0.94 ] [ 0.02 ]
Unrestricted VECM for Case 2
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Table A.7: LR Tests for Case 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case 1: Loading Coefficients (α) do not Change 
Hypothesis χ2  stat p-value Hypothesis χ2  stat p-value
 Ho: β dpi = 0 3.10 0.06  Ho: β dpi = 0 10.57 0.00
 Ho: β fw  = 0 2.71 0.10  Ho: β fw  = 0 0.13 0.85
 Ho: β hw = 0 0.17 0.83  Ho: β hw = 0 5.55 0.02
Hypothesis χ2  stat p-value
 Ho: α con = 0 4.54 0.02
 Ho: α dpi = 0 2.01 0.14
 Ho: α fw  = 0 0.41 0.74
 Ho: α hw = 0 8.90 0.00
After the Break
LR tests on β  Coefficients in the Cointegration Vector
1991Q1-2011Q1 (entire period)
LR tests on α  Coefficients
Before the Break
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Table A.8: LR Tests for Case 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case 2: Loading Coefficients (α) do Change 
Hypothesis χ2  stat p-value Hypothesis χ2  stat p-value
 Ho: β dpi = 0 6.31 0.01  Ho: β dpi = 0 10.92 0.00
 Ho: β fw  = 0 3.99 0.03  Ho: β fw  = 0 2.01 0.13
 Ho: β hw = 0 0.13 0.85  Ho: β hw = 0 3.61 0.05
Hypothesis χ2  stat p-value Hypothesis χ2  stat p-value
 Ho: α con = 0 4.37 0.02  Ho: α con = 0 6.78 0.01
 Ho: α dpi = 0 6.31 0.01  Ho: α dpi = 0 0.26 0.23
 Ho: α fw  = 0 0.07 0.99  Ho: α fw  = 0 0.03 0.99
 Ho: α hw = 0 1.34 0.25  Ho: α hw = 0 10.23 0.00
Before the Break After the Break
LR tests on α  Coefficients 
LR tests on β  Coefficients in the Cointegration Vector
Before the Break After the Break
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Table A.9: Diagnostic Test Results for Case 1 (Chap. 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Statistics p-value Result
Q-Stat
ucon 10.01 0.83
udpi 14.60 0.56
ufw 13.90 0.61
uhw 21.80 0.15
χ 2 -stat
ucon 0.17 0.92
udpi 0.46 0.79
ufw 0.43 0.81
uhw 0.48 0.79
χ 2 -stat
ucon 4.28 0.51
udpi 1.65 0.89
ufw 2.39 0.79
uhw 3.64 0.79
Diagnostic Test Results for the Unrestricted VECM's Residuals for the Case 1
ARCH-LM Test 
Te
st
s 
fo
r N
on
no
rm
al
ity
   Ho: "Residual vector ui 
comes from a normal 
distribution"         where 
i=consa,dpi,fw,hw
We cannot reject the null 
hypothesis. Thus,there is no 
ARCH up to order 16 in the 
residuals. 
Te
st
s 
fo
r H
et
er
os
ce
da
st
ic
ity
Jarque-BeraTest  
   Ho: " There is no ARCH up to 
order 5 in the residual vector 
ui "                                  
where i=consa,dpi,fw,hw
We cannot reject the null 
hypothesis. Thus, overall, 
there is no residual 
autocorrelations up to lag 16.
We cannot reject the null 
hypothesis. Thus,residual 
vector comes from a normal 
distribution.
Test and Hypothesis
Portmanteau Test
Te
st
 fo
r A
ut
oc
or
re
la
tio
n
    Ho: "Rh=(r1,...,r16)=0"  
where R is autocorrelation 
vector.
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Table A.10: Diagnostic Test Results for Case 2 (Chap. 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Statistics p-value Result
Q-Stat
ucon 10.03 0.85
udpi 14.35 0.57
ufw 13.91 0.61
uhw 20.86 0.18
χ 2 -stat
ucon 0.22 0.90
udpi 0.35 0.85
ufw 0.50 0.78
uhw 0.46 0.79
χ 2 -stat
ucon 4.32 0.51
udpi 1.53 0.91
ufw 2.30 0.81
uhw 3.65 0.60
Diagnostic Test Results for the Unrestricted VECM's Residuals for the Case 2
Te
st
s 
fo
r H
et
er
os
ce
da
st
ic
ity ARCH-LM Test 
   Ho: " There is no ARCH up to 
order 5 in the residual vector 
ui "                                  where 
i=consa,dpi,fw,hw
We cannot reject the null 
hypothesis. Thus,there is no 
ARCH up to order 16 in the 
residuals. 
Te
st
s 
fo
r N
on
no
rm
al
ity
Jarque-BeraTest  
   Ho: "Residual vector ui 
comes from a normal 
distribution"              where 
i=consa,dpi,fw,hw
We cannot reject the null 
hypothesis. Thus,residual 
vector comes from a normal 
distribution.
Te
st
 fo
r A
ut
oc
or
re
la
tio
n Portmanteau Test
    Ho: "Rh=(r1,...,r16)=0"  
where R is autocorrelation 
vector.
We cannot reject the null 
hypothesis. Thus, overall, 
there is no residual 
autocorrelations up to lag 16.
Test and Hypothesis
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Table A.11: Restricted Cointegration Vectors for Case 1 (Chap. 2) 
 
 
Table A.12: Restricted Cointegration Vectors for Case 2 (Chap. 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case Before 2001 After 2001
Loading coefficients 
do not change cont=0.80dpit+0.11fwt+0.04hwt+ec1t cont=0.30dpit+0.03fwt+0.25hwt+ec2t
Loading coefficients 
change cont=0.82dpit+0.11fwt+0.02hwt+ec1t con=0.27dpit+0.12fwt+0.20hwt+ec2t
Case Before 2001 After 2001
Loading coefficients 
do not change cont=0.83dpit+0.13fwt+ec1t con=0.30dpit+0.28hwt+ec2t
Loading coefficients 
change cont=0.84dpit+0.13fwt+ec1t cont=0.28dpit+0.29hwt+ec2t
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Table A.13: Restricted VECM Results for Case 1
 
 
Estimated cointegration relations:
con dpi fw hw
ect≤t0 1.00 -0.83 -0.13 --
ect>t0 1.00 -0.30 -- -0.28
∆con(t) ∆dpi(t) ∆fw(t) ∆hw(t)
Loading coefficients
α t -0.09 -- -- 0.25
p-value [ 0.02 ] [ -- ] [ -- ] [ 0.00 ]
Lagged endogenous terms
∆con(t-1) -- -- -- -0.37
p-value [ -- ] [ -- ] [ -- ] [ 0.01 ]
∆dpi(t-1) -- -0.23 -- --
p-value [ -- ] [ 0.02 ] [ -- ] [ -- ]
∆fw(t-1) 0.08 -- -- --
p-value [ 0.01 ] [ -- ] [ -- ] [ -- ]
∆hw(t-1) -- -0.31 -- --
p-value [ -- ] [ 0.01 ] [ -- ] [ -- ]
Deterministic terms
c 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
p-value [ 0.01 ] [ 0.02 ] [ 0.05 ] [ 0.01 ]
d94Q2 -0.05 -- -- -0.06
p-value [ 0.01 ] [ -- ] [ -- ] [ 0.00 ]
d98Q3 -0.02 -- -0.16 --
p-value [ 0.67 ] [ -- ] [ 0.01 ] [ -- ]
d99Q4 0.00 -- 0.06 -0.03
p-value [ 0.66 ] [ -- ] [ 0.05 ] [ 0.01 ]
d01Q1 -0.02 -0.12 -- -0.04
p-value [ 0.02 ] [ 0.00 ] [ -- ] [ 0.01 ]
d01Q2 -0.05 -- -- -0.01
p-value [ 0.01 ] [ -- ] [ -- ] [ 0.01 ]
d98Q1 0.03 -- -- --
p-value [ 0.02 ] [ -- ] [ -- ] [ -- ]
Restricted VECM for Case 1
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Table A.14: Restricted VECM Results for Case 2 
 
Estimated cointegration relations:
con dpi fw hw
ect≤t0 1.00 -0.84 -0.13 --
ect>t0 1.00 -0.29 -- -0.30
∆con(t) ∆dpi(t) ∆fw(t) ∆hw(t)
Loading coefficients
α t≤t0 -0.05 0.15 -- --
p-value [ 0.03 ] [ 0.04 ] [ -- ] [ -- ]
α t>t0 -0.12 -- -- 0.27
p-value [ 0.01 ] [ -- ] [ -- ] [ 0.00 ]
Lagged endogenous terms
∆con(t-1) -- 0.45 -- -0.33
p-value [ -- ] [ 0.04 ] [ -- ] [ 0.01 ]
∆dpi(t-1) -- -0.36 -- --
p-value [ -- ] [ 0.00 ] [ -- ] [ -- ]
∆fw(t-1) 0.09 -- -- --
p-value [ 0.01 ] [ -- ] [ -- ] [ -- ]
∆hw(t-1) -- -0.38 -- --
p-value [ -- ] [ 0.01 ] [ -- ] [ -- ]
Deterministic terms
c 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01
p-value [ 0.01 ] [ 0.01 ] [ 0.01 ] [ 0.01 ]
d94Q2 -0.07 -0.03 -- -0.06
p-value [ 0.00 ] [ 0.01 ] [ -- ] [ 0.00 ]
d98Q3 -- -0.03 -0.11 -0.03
p-value [ -- ] [ 0.03 ] [ 0.00 ] [ 0.03 ]
d99Q4 -- -- 0.07 -0.05
p-value [ -- ] [ -- ] [ 0.01 ] [ 0.03 ]
d01Q1 -0.06 -0.14 -0.07 -0.04
p-value [ 0.00 ] [ 0.01 ] [ 0.08 ] [ 0.00 ]
d01Q2 -0.03 -0.01 -- -0.11
p-value [ 0.01 ] [ 0.01 ] [ -- ] [ 0.00 ]
d98Q1 0.03 -0.01 -- 0.03
p-value [ 0.01 ] [ 0.02 ] [ -- ] [ 0.01 ]
Restricted VECM for Case 2
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Table A.15: Diagnostic Test Results for Case 1 (Restricted) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Statistics p-value Result
Q-Stat
ucon 11.97 0.75
udpi 16.40 0.43
ufw 13.90 0.61
uhw 16.29 0.43
χ 2 -stat
ucon 0.39 0.82
udpi 1.39 0.50
ufw 0.50 0.78
uhw 0.39 0.82
ucon 5.13 0.40
udpi 2.73 0.74
ufw 2.28 0.81
uhw 4.78 0.44
Te
st
 fo
r A
ut
oc
or
re
la
tio
n
    Ho: "Rh=(r1,...,r16)=0"  
where R is autocorrelation 
vector.
Jarque-BeraTest  
Te
st
s 
fo
r N
on
no
rm
al
ity
Test and Hypothesis
Portmanteau Test
Diagnostic Test Results for the Restricted VECM's Residuals for the Case 1
We cannot reject the null 
hypothesis. Thus, overall, 
there is no residual 
autocorrelations up to lag 16.
We cannot reject the null 
hypothesis. Thus,residual 
vector comes from a normal 
distribution.
We cannot reject the null 
hypothesis. Thus,there is no 
ARCH up to order 16 in the 
residuals. 
Te
st
s 
fo
r H
et
er
os
ce
da
st
ic
ity
   Ho: " There is no ARCH up 
to order 5 in the residual 
vector ui "                                  
where i=consa,dpi,fw,hw
ARCH-LM Test 
   Ho: "Residual vector ui 
comes from a normal 
distribution"         where 
i=consa,dpi,fw,hw
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Table A.16: Diagnostic Test Results for Case 2 (Restricted) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Statistics p-value Result
Q-Stat
ucon 10.44 0.84
udpi 16.21 0.44
ufw 13.28 0.65
uhw 17.90 0.33
χ 2 -stat
ucon 0.54 0.76
udpi 1.40 0.50
ufw 0.69 0.71
uhw 0.13 0.94
ucon 5.22 0.39
udpi 1.81 0.87
ufw 2.10 0.83
uhw 5.12 0.41
Diagnostic Test Results for the Restricted VECM's Residuals for the Case 2
We cannot reject the null 
hypothesis. Thus, overall, 
there is no residual 
autocorrelations up to lag 16.
We cannot reject the null 
hypothesis. Thus,residual 
vector comes from a normal 
distribution.
Te
st
s 
fo
r H
et
er
os
ce
da
st
ic
ity ARCH-LM Test 
   Ho: " There is no ARCH up 
to order 5 in the residual 
vector ui "                                  
where i=consa,dpi,fw,hw
We cannot reject the null 
hypothesis. Thus,there is no 
ARCH up to order 16 in the 
residuals. 
Test and Hypothesis
Te
st
s 
fo
r N
on
no
rm
al
ity
Jarque-BeraTest  
   Ho: "Residual vector ui 
comes from a normal 
distribution"              where 
i=consa,dpi,fw,hw
Te
st
 fo
r A
ut
oc
or
re
la
tio
n Portmanteau Test
    Ho: "Rh=(r1,...,r16)=0"  
where R is autocorrelation 
vector.
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Table A.17: Unit Root Tests (Chap. 3) 
 
 
 
 
Level t-stats Level t-stats 
Deterministic Part Lagsϒ Deterministic Part Lagsϒ
c,nt 1-8 -0.67 c,nt 1-2 -0.48
c,t 1-8 -1.95 c,t 1-2 -2.75
c,nt 1-5 -1.20 c,nt 1-3 -1.12
c,t 1-5 -1.65 c,t 1-3 -1.92
c,nt 1-5 -1.72 c,nt 1-5 -1.32
c,t 1-5 -2.45 c,t 1-5 -2.73
c,nt 1-5 -1.33 c,nt 1-5 -1.12
c,t 1-5 -2.44 c,t 1-5 -2.46
c,nt 1-5 -2.43 c,nt 1-5 -1.19
c,t 1-5 -3.54 c,t 1-5 -2.78
c,nt 1-8 0.86 c,nt 1-5 0.44
c,t 1-8 -2.02 c,t 1-5 -2.32
First 
Differenced
First 
Differenced
c,nt 1-2 -6.66*** c,nt 1-2 -5.00***
c,t 1-2 -6.76*** c,t 1-2 -6.16***
c,nt 1-4 -7.34*** c,nt 1-3 -6.18***
c,t 1-4 -8.17*** c,t 1-3 -7.15***
c,nt 1-4 -1.57 c,nt 1-4 -2.02
c,t 1-4 -5.74*** c,t 1-4 -5.91***
c,nt 1-4 -6.51*** c,nt 1-4 -5.70***
c,t 1-4 -8.17*** c,t 1-4 -8.21***
c,nt 1-4 -5.51*** c,nt 1-4 -4.70***
c,t 1-4 -7.17*** c,t 1-4 -7.91***
c,nt 1-7 -6.16*** c,nt 1-7 -5.76***
c,t 1-7 -6.18*** c,t 1-7 -8.53***
ϒ: Lags are determined according to AIC and diagnostic test results.
*, **, ***: denotes 10%, 5%, 1% significance respectively.
#: Shift dummy was used as a break
∆RIV
∆CPI
∆CONS
∆RHP
∆CPI
EXC
∆INT
CONS
RHP
CPI
INT
∆CONS
∆RHP
∆EXC
RIV
ADF Test for Unit Root with Structural Break #
Model
ADF Test for Unit Root
Model
CONS
RHP
∆INT
∆EXC
CPI
INT
RIV
∆RIV
EXC
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Table A.18: Information Criteria (Chap. 3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AIC SC HQ
p=1 -37.67 -33.57 -36.03
p=2 -38.41 -32.11 -35.89
p=3 -39.52 -30.99 -36.11
p=4 -42.53 -31.75 -38.22
#: VAR includes; shift and slope dummies.
VAR(p)
Information Criteria
Lag Order Selection (includes structural break) #
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Table A.19: Cointegration Test Results (Chap. 3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ho:rank=r H1:rank>r LR p-value 90% 95% 99%
r=0 r>0 121.73 0.000 86.64 90.95 99.40
r=1 r>1 94.21 0.000 62.45 66.13 73.42
r=2 r>2 48.85 0.021 42.25 45.32 51.45
r=3 r>3 23.41 0.195 26.07 28.52 33.50
r=4 r>4 16.88 0.032 13.88 15.76 19.71
Ho:rank=r H1:rank>r LR p-value 90% 95% 99%
r=0 r>0 169.02 0.000 112.54 117.45 127.04
r=1 r>1 109.94 0.001 84.27 88.55 96.97
r=2 r>2 68.59 0.017 60.00 63.66 70.91
r=3 r>3 32.01 0.394 39.73 42.77 48.87
r=4 r>4 11.94 0.814 23.32 25.73 30.67
Ho:rank=r H1:rank>r LR p-value 90% 95% 99%
r=0 r>0 219.47 0.000 140.94 146.48 157.26
r=1 r>1 134.5 0.001 108.59 113.49 123.08
r=2 r>2 84.35 0.051 80.06 84.33 92.73
r=3 r>3 43.66 0.506 55.40 59.02 66.24
r=4 r>4 18.56 0.873 34.41 37.36 43.33
1: includes; intercept, trend, 4 lags in level and impulse dummies.
Johansen Trace Test 1
Johansen Trace Test 2
2: includes; intercept, trend, 4 lags in level, shift dummy and other impulse 
dummies. Response surface that gives the critical values are computed via 
Jmulti.
Saikkonen&Lutkepohl 1
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Table A.20: Diagnostic Test Results (Chap. 3) 
 
Statistics p-value Result
Q-Stat
ucon 15.49 0.49
uriv 14.44 0.53
urhp 8.53 0.93
ucpi 17.57 0.35
uexc 12.71 0.69
uint 19.16 0.26
χ 2 -stat
ucon 0.44 0.80
uriv 0.81 0.78
urhp 0.99 0.61
ucpi 0.94 0.63
uexc 4.77 0.08
uint 2.85 0.24
χ 2 -stat
ucon 4.91 0.43
uriv 4.82 0.48
urhp 4.24 0.52
ucpi 4.03 0.54
uexc 1.14 0.95
uint 3.64 0.79
   Ho: "Residual vector ui 
comes from a normal 
distribution" where 
i=consa,dpi,fw,hw
ARCH-LM Test 
We cannot reject the null 
hypothesis. Thus,there is no 
ARCH up to order 5 in the 
residuals. 
Te
st
s 
fo
r H
et
er
os
ce
da
st
ic
ity
   Ho: " There is no ARCH up to 
order 5 in the residual vector 
ui "  where i=consa,dpi,fw,hw
Diagnostic Test Results for the VECM's Residuals 
We cannot reject the null 
hypothesis. Thus, there is no 
residual autocorrelations up 
to lag 16.
We cannot reject the null 
hypothesis. Thus,residual 
vector comes from a normal 
distribution.
Test and Hypothesis
Portmanteau Test
Te
st
 fo
r A
ut
oc
or
re
la
tio
n
    Ho: "Rh=(r1,...,r16)=0"  
where R is autocorrelation 
vector.
Jarque-BeraTest  
Te
st
s 
fo
r N
on
no
rm
al
ity
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Table A.21: Cointegration Vectors (Chap. 3) 
  Before 2001 
1st ec1t=18.75cont-8.5rivt-11.8cpit+37.8rhpt+0.03intt+52exct-2.75trend 
2nd ec2t=3.1cont+1.1cont-4.7cpit-15.2rhpt+0.11intt-16exct+1.5trend 
3rd ec3t=7.1cont+6.1cont-4.9cpit-1.5rhpt+0.01intt-11exct+7.5trend 
  After 2001 
1st ec1t=-72.9cont+7.42rivt+37.1cpit-0.97rhpt+0.05intt-14.4exct+0.4trend 
2nd ec2t=-11.4cont+4.2rivt+5.2cpit+15.8rhpt-0.06intt-31.6exct+0.01trend 
3rd ec3t=-1.3cont+5.6rivt+4.2cpit+13.6rhpt-0.03intt-3.6exct+0.1trend 
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Appendix B 
 
Figures 
 
Figure B.1: Ratio of Consumer Credit with Housing Collateral to Total 
 
Source: BRSA 
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Figure B.2: The Comparison of Real Floor Cost and Real Rent 
 
Source: TurkStat 
 
Figure B.3: The Comparison of House Price and Rent 
 
Source: Reidin.com 
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Figure B.4: Time-Series Data (Chap. 2) 
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Figure B.4: Time-Series Data (Chap. 2) (continued) 
        
 
 
       
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
 
 
       
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.50
3.60
3.70
3.80
3.90
4.00
4.10
4.20
4.30
4.40
19
91
Q
1
19
92
Q
2
19
93
Q
3
19
94
Q
4
19
96
Q
1
19
97
Q
2
19
98
Q
3
19
99
Q
4
20
01
Q
1
20
02
Q
2
20
03
Q
3
20
04
Q
4
20
06
Q
1
20
07
Q
2
20
08
Q
3
20
09
Q
4
Real Financial Wealth per Capita (fw) 
4.20
4.30
4.40
4.50
4.60
4.70
4.80
4.90
5.00
19
91
Q
1
19
92
Q
2
19
93
Q
3
19
94
Q
4
19
96
Q
1
19
97
Q
2
19
98
Q
3
19
99
Q
4
20
01
Q
1
20
02
Q
2
20
03
Q
3
20
04
Q
4
20
06
Q
1
20
07
Q
2
20
08
Q
3
20
09
Q
4
Real Housing Wealth per Capita (hw) 
88 
 
Figure B.5: Monetary Transmission Mechanism 
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Figure B.6: Time-Series Data (Chap. 3) 
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  Figure B.6: Time-Series Data (Chap. 3) (continued) 
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Figure B.7: IRFs for Int. Rate Shock (Benchmark Ordering, pre-2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  These graphs show the impulse responses to a one unit contractionary monetary policy for the pre-2001 period. Dashed lines 
represent 90% percent coinfidence intervals of the responses. The ordering of the identification scheme is [ RIV, CONS, RHP, CPI, 
EXC, INT] where RIV, CONS, CPI, EXC, INT and RHP represent residential investment, consumption, inflation, exchange rates, 
interest rate and house price index respectively.
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Figure B.8: IRFs for Int. Rate Shock (Benchmark Ordering, post-2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  These graphs show the impulse responses to a one unit contractionary monetary policy for the post-2001 period. 
Dashed lines represent 90% percent coinfidence intervals of the responses. The ordering of the identification scheme is [ RIV, 
CONS, RHP, CPI, EXC, INT] where RIV, CONS, CPI, EXC, INT and RHP represent residential investment, consumption, 
inflation, exchange rates, interest rate and house price index respectively.
INT => INT
-0.1
0.1
0.3
0.5
0.7
0.9
1.1
1.3
1.5
1.7
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
quarter
po
in
t
INT => RIV
-1.4
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
quarter
%
 c
ha
ng
e
INT => CONS
-0.8
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
quarter
%
 c
ha
ng
e
INT => CPI
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
quarter
%
 c
ha
ng
e
INT => RHP
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
quarter
%
 c
ha
ng
e
INT => EXC
-0.1
0.1
0.3
0.5
0.7
0.9
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
quarter
%
 c
ha
ng
e
93 
 
Figure B.9: IRFs for Int. Rate Shock (Benchmark Ordering, 1991-2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: These graphs show the impulse responses to a contractionary monetary policy for both pre and post-2001 period. RIV, CONS, 
CPI, EXC, INT and RHP represent residential investment, consumption, inflation, exchange rates, interest rate and house price index 
respectively. As it is seen from the responses residential investment, consumption and inlation become more responsive (decrease 
more after a contractionary interest rate shock) to an interest rate shock after 2001. It is also seen that house prices and exchange 
rates show opposite movements in both periods. Before 2001 house price slightly increase and exchange rate decreases whereas, 
after 2001, house price decreases and exchange rates increases  after an contractionary interest rate shock.
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Figure B.10: IRFs for House Price Shock (Benchmark Ordering, pre-2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  These graphs show the impulse responses to a one unit house price shock for the pre-2001 period. Dashed lines 
represent 90% percent coinfidence intervals of the responses. The ordering of the identification scheme is [ RIV, RHP, CPI, 
EXC, CONS, INT] where RIV, CONS, CPI, EXC, INT and RHP represent residential investment, consumption, inflation, 
exchange rates, interest rate and house price index respectively.
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Figure B.11: IRFs for House Price Shock (Benchmark Ordering, post-2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  These graphs show the impulse responses to a one unit house price shock for the post-2001 period. Dashed lines 
represent 90% percent coinfidence intervals of the responses. The ordering of the identification scheme is [ RIV, RHP, CPI, EXC, 
CONS, INT] where RIV, CONS, CPI, EXC, INT and RHP represent residential investment, consumption, inflation, exchange 
rates, interest rate and house price index respectively.
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Figure B.12: IRFs for Int. Rate Shock (Counterfactual Exp., Bench. Ord., pre-
2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  These graphs show the impulse responses to a one unit contractionary monetary policy for the post-2001 period. Solid lines 
represent the responses of the benchmark model whereas the the lines with squares represent the simulated model responses. 
Dashed lines represent 90% percent coinfidence intervals of the responses. The ordering of the identification scheme is [ RIV, CONS, 
RHP, CPI, EXC, INT] where RIV, CONS, CPI, EXC, INT and RHP represent residential investment, consumption, inflation, exchange 
rates, interest rate and house price index respectively.
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Figure B.13: IRFs for Int. Rate Shock (Counterfactual Exp., Bench. Ord., post-
2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  These graphs show the impulse responses to a one unit contractionary monetary policy for the post-2001 period. Solid lines 
represent the responses of the benchmark model whereas the the lines with squares represent the simulated model responses. 
Dashed lines represent 90% percent coinfidence intervals of the responses. The ordering of the identification scheme is [ RIV, 
CONS, RHP, CPI, EXC, INT] where RIV, CONS, CPI, EXC, INT and RHP represent residential investment, consumption, inflation, 
exchange rates, interest rate and house price index respectively.
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Figure B.14: IRFs for Int. Rate Shock (Alternative Ordering 1, pre-2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  These graphs show the impulse responses to a one unit contractionary monetary policy for the pre-2001 period. Dashed lines 
represent 90% percent coinfidence intervals of the responses. The ordering of the identification scheme is [CONS, RIV, CPI, EXC, 
INT, RHP] where RIV, CONS, CPI, EXC, INT and RHP represent residential investment, consumption, inflation, exchange rates, 
interest rate and house price index respectively.
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Figure B.15: IRFs for Int. Rate Shock (Alternative Ordering 1, post-2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  These graphs show the impulse responses to a one unit contractionary monetary policy for the post-2001 period. Dashed 
lines represent 90% percent coinfidence intervals of the responses. The ordering of the identification scheme is [CONS, RIV, 
CPI, EXC, INT, RHP] where RIV, CONS, CPI, EXC, INT and RHP represent residential investment, consumption, inflation, 
exchange rates, interest rate and house price index respectively.
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Figure B.16: IRFs for Int. Rate Shock (Counterfactual Exp., Alt. Ord. 1, pre-2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  These graphs show the impulse responses to a one unit contractionary monetary policy for the pre-2001 period. Solid lines 
represent the responses of the benchmark model whereas the the lines with squares represent the simulated model responses. 
Dashed lines represent 90% percent coinfidence intervals of the responses. The ordering of the identification scheme is [CONS, RIV, 
CPI, EXC, INT, RHP] where RIV, CONS, CPI, EXC, INT and RHP represent residential investment, consumption, inflation, exchange 
rates, interest rate and house price index respectively.
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Figure B.17: IRFs for Int. Rate Shock (Counterfactual Exp., Alt. Ord. 1, post-2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  These graphs show the impulse responses to a one unit contractionary monetary policy for the post-2001 period. Solid 
lines represent the responses of the benchmark model whereas the the lines with squares represent the simulated model 
responses. Dashed lines represent 90% percent coinfidence intervals of the responses. The ordering of the identification 
scheme is [CONS, RIV, CPI, EXC, INT, RHP] where RIV, CONS, CPI, EXC, INT and RHP represent residential investment, 
consumption, inflation, exchange rates, interest rate and house price index respectively.
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Figure B.18: IRFs for Int. Rate Shock (Alternative Ordering 2, pre-2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  These graphs show the impulse responses to a one unit contractionary monetary policy for the pre-2001 period. Dashed lines 
represent 90% percent coinfidence intervals of the responses. The ordering of the identification scheme is [ RIV, RHP, CPI, EXC, 
CONS, INT] where RIV, CONS, CPI, EXC, INT and RHP represent residential investment, consumption, inflation, exchange rates, 
interest rate and house price index respectively.
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Figure B.19: IRFs for Int. Rate Shock (Alternative Ordering 2, post-2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  These graphs show the impulse responses to a one unit contractionary monetary policy for the post-2001 period. Dashed 
lines represent 90% percent coinfidence intervals of the responses. The ordering of the identification scheme is [ RIV, RHP, CPI, 
EXC, CONS, INT] where RIV, CONS, CPI, EXC, INT and RHP represent residential investment, consumption, inflation, exchange 
rates, interest rate and house price index respectively.
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Figure B.20: IRFs for Int. Rate Shock (Counterfactual Exp., Alt. Ord. 2, pre-2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  These graphs show the impulse responses to a one unit contractionary monetary policy for the pre-2001 period. Solid lines 
represent the responses of the benchmark model whereas the the lines with squares represent the simulated model responses. 
Dashed lines represent 90% percent coinfidence intervals of the responses. The ordering of the identification scheme is [ RIV, RHP, 
CPI, EXC, CONS, INT] where RIV, CONS, CPI, EXC, INT and RHP represent residential investment, consumption, inflation, 
exchange rates, interest rate and house price index respectively.
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Figure B.21: IRFs for Int. Rate Shock (Counterfactual Exp., Alt. Ord. 2, post-
2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  These graphs show the impulse responses to a one unit contractionary monetary policy for the post-2001 period. Solid 
lines represent the responses of the benchmark model whereas the the lines with squares represent the simulated model 
responses. Dashed lines represent 90% percent coinfidence intervals of the responses. The ordering of the identification 
scheme is [ RIV, RHP, CPI, EXC, CONS, INT] where RIV, CONS, CPI, EXC, INT and RHP represent residential investment, 
consumption, inflation, exchange rates, interest rate and house price index respectively.
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Appendix C 
 
Data Sources 
 
 
Data Definition Source
Consumption 
(CON)
Logarithm of the real total private consumption 
expenditure derived from real GDP series which is divided 
by population. Central Bank of Republic of Turkey
Disposable 
Income (DPI)
Logarithm of the nominal DPI is divided by population and 
deflated by private consumption expenditure deflator 
derived from the GDP series. Since there is no DPI series 
for Turkey, it is derived from the following calculation;
DPI=C+I+NG+NX+NFI-D 
where
C: total private consumption Central Bank of Republic of Turkey
I: Gross fixed capital formation Central Bank of Republic of Turkey
NG: Net government expenditure (government 
expenditure-government revenue) Republic of Turkey Ministry of Finance
NX: Net exports of gooods and services Central Bank of Republic of Turkey
NFI: Net factor incomes Central Bank of Republic of Turkey
D: Depreciation (consumption of fixed capital used as a 
proxy) Turkish Statistical Institute
Housing 
Wealth (HW)
Logarithm of the nominal HW is divided by population and 
deflated by private consumption expenditure deflator 
derived from the GDP series. Nominal HW is derived from 
the following calculation;
HW=HP*NDS-HC
HP: House price that is derived from rent price index. Central Bank of Republic of Turkey
NDS: Net dwelling stock (0.0025 is used for amortization)
Central Bank of Republic of Turkey, 
Turkish Statistical Institute 
HC: Housing Credits Central Bank of Republic of Turkey
Financial 
Wealth (FW)
Logarithm of the net nominal FW is divided by population 
and deflated by private consumption expenditure deflator 
derived from the GDP series. Net nominal FW is derived 
from the following calculation;
FW=M2Y+S-CC
M2Y: Currency in circulation+deposits in both Lira and 
other currencies Central Bank of Republic of Turkey
S: Istanbul Stock Exchange Market Capitalization Istanbul Stock Exchange
CC: Consumer Credits (except mortgage credits) Central Bank of Republic of Turkey
Price Level 
(CPI) Consumer Price Index Central Bank of Republic of Turkey
Residential  
Investment logarithm of residential construction (m2) Central Bank of Republic of Turkey
Exchange 
Rate (EXC) logarithm of US Dollar/Turkish Lira Central Bank of Republic of Turkey
Interest Rate 
(INT) Avarage of O/N Interest rates Central Bank of Republic of Turkey
Population
Quarterly figures interpolated from yearly data assuming 
intra year linearity. WDI
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